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ABSTRACT 
Since October 2012, certain family members of refugees seeking reunification 
through the United States Refugee Admissions Priority Three program must undergo 
DNA testing to prove they are genetically related. The putative purposes of the 
policy include fraud prevention, enhanced national security, and greater efficiency in 
refugee claims processing. Upon close inspection, however, the new policy generates 
significant sociopolitical and legal concerns. The notion of what constitutes a family 
is significantly narrowed. Required DNA testing may violate domestic laws and 
international human rights instruments regarding voluntary informed consent, 
privacy, and anti-discrimination. Traditional legal solutions insufficiently remedy 
these concerns and cannot prevent the collective march towards an intractable risk 
society that views the “Other” as a potential fraud. Alternative strategies to mitigate 
the impact of the new policy are recommended. Such strategies can allow for a more 
nuanced understanding of family and a firmer understanding of the inherent but also 
uncertain risks of DNA technology in the immigration and refugee context. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR TRUTH 
ruly and truthfully, who are you? 
The answer to this question matters to each of us in disparate 
ways, yet it is particularly significant for refugees who seek a better 
life in the United States. The truth about who they are can set them 
free, while deception—deemed such by another—can condemn them. 
How identity and truth are determined for those seeking a better life 
has metamorphosed radically in just a few years. 
As evidence of this claim, this Article examines a processing 
category in the United States Refugee Admissions Program, 
commonly referred to as the Priority Three, or P-3, family 
reunification program. Since October 2012, unmarried children under 
twenty-one years of age and parents of persons (called an anchor 
relative) lawfully admitted to the United States as refugees or asylees 
or permanent residents, or U.S. citizens who previously had refugee or 
asylum status, must undergo DNA testing to prove they are genetically 
related to the anchor relative.1 
DNA testing has expanded to a constellation of fields, especially 
the forensic and familial, and, ostensibly, there are multiple beneficial 
purposes behind the policy. Some of the main claimed benefits for 
DNA testing in the refugee context include the following: establishing 
conclusive evidence of biological family relationships where no other 
evidence exists, to allow families to reunite;2 preventing instances of 
                                                            
1 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and 
Migration (Oct. 4, 2012), available at http://www.usrap.iom.int/joomla_25/
images/RSC/P3/p-3%20program%20general%20info%2010-4-12.pdf 
[herinafter PRM Press Release]. 
2 See, e.g., Cindy Carcamo, Faces of Immigration: DNA Test Reunites Family, 
ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Dec. 14, 2011, available at http://
www.ocregister.com/articles/hoang-331467-dat-son.html (describing the 
situation of a Vietnamese mother in the U.S. on a special visa who had no 
documentary evidence to prove her biological relation to her son. After each 
took a DNA test that rendered a match, the mother’s application was granted and 
the family was reunited after more than five years apart. The son told the 
reporter, “I didn’t think much about what they were asking because I knew I was 
my mom’s son,” and the mother told the reporter, “I knew he was my son.”). See 
also Alexandra Zabjek, Refugees Undergo DNA Tests to Reunite Families, 
EDMONTON JOURNAL (Can.), Jul. 16, 2007, at A13 (discussing how an adoptive 
parent from Rwanda took a DNA test and “it didn’t surprise us,” because “it’s 
something that we were actually waiting for [and because] if they don’t ask us, it 
means the process is far from being done.”). 
T 
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real fraud, such as the buying and selling of refugee slots by “refugee 
brokers”;3 preventing human trafficking, as children may be petitioned 
for by persons who are bringing them to the U.S. as sex slaves or 
household slaves;4 denying entry to those who may be terrorists;5 
reducing adjudication errors;6 saving costs by improving efficiency 
                                                            
3 See RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34007, IMMIGRATION 
FRAUD: POLICIES, INVESTIGATIONS, AND ISSUES (2007). See also Miriam Jordan, 
Refugee Program Halted As DNA Tests Show Fraud, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 
2008, at A3 (quoting the president of Lutheran Immigration and Refugee 
Services as saying refugee slots are precious and “[d]esperation makes people 
more susceptible to abuse or bribery.”); JILL ESBENSHADE, IMMIGRATION 
POLICY CENTER, AN ASSESSMENT OF DNA TESTING FOR AFRICAN REFUGEES 10 
(2010) [hereinafter ESBENSHADE, ASSESSMENT] (noting that prior to the DNA 
pilot test project in Nairobi, USCIS and PRM were concerned about widespread 
reports of the existence of brokers who sold slots, provided documents, and 
coached applicants for the interviews); Emily Holland, Moving the Virtual 
Border to the Cellular Level: Mandatory DNA Testing and the U.S. Refugee 
Family Reunification Program, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1635, 1676 (2011). 
4 There is no evidence that such a situation has occurred, but examples exist in the 
international adoption context. See, e.g., Larry Kaplow & Sonia Perez D., 
Guatemala Mother Searched 5 Years for Adopted Girl, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Aug. 6, 2011, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/06/
guatemala-mother-searched_1_n_920259.html (describing situation of a 
Guatemalan mother submitting her DNA to prove maternity and have her 
kidnapped child returned, after the child had been adopted by an American 
family). See also Juan Carlos Llorca, US Couple Almost Adopted Stolen 
Guatemalan Baby, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jul. 31, 2008, available at http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20080731/guatemala-stolen-babies/ 
(describing situation of a Guatemalan mother having her baby kidnapped at 
gunpoint; fourteen months later, the mother spotted the child near an orphanage, 
just before an American couple was to adopt her; DNA testing proved her 
maternity and the authorities returned the child to her.). 
5 DNA testing may allow for sharing of genetic data with the Department of 
Defense terrorist database and the Interpol database, which combined have more 
than 200,000 DNA profiles of terror suspects. See, e.g., Noah Shachtman, 
Detainees Fill Pentagon DNA Databank, WIRED (Oct. 14, 2008), http://
www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/10/detainees-fill/. See also INTERPOL’s 
DNA database, http://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Forensics/DNA 
(last visited May 2, 2013). 
6 Though not discussed in this Article, quality control of DNA samples is an issue 
of concern. See Janice D. Villiers, Brave New World: The Use and Potential 
Misuse of DNA Technology in Immigration Law, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 
239, 264–65 (2010). DNA testing is also not 100 percent foolproof; Holland, 
supra note 3, at 1662 n.186; See, e.g., She’s Her Own Twin, ABC PRIMETIME 
(Aug. 15, 2006), http://abcnews.go.com/Primetime/story?id=2315693#
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(that is, accelerating the processing or adjudication time by reducing 
the need to submit multiple documents);7 and promoting inter- and 
intra-governmental information sharing to deny entry to criminals, 
prevent future crimes, or help in forensic investigations of crimes.8 
                                                                                                                                            
.UKuriofAe0s (discussing story of two mothers whose DNA tests revealed they 
were not the biological mothers of their children—even though they were—a 
consequence of “chimerism,” a rare situation whereby two eggs are 
simultaneously fertilized and fuse together to create one individual instead of 
twins, but with two separate strands of DNA). See also Andreas O. Karlsson et 
al., DNA-testing for Immigration Cases: The Risk of Erroneous Conclusions, 
172 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 144 (2007) (finding that using inappropriate population 
frequency databases had minor effects on error rates, while likelihood ratios 
varied from an underestimation of 100 times up to an overestimation of 100,000 
times, but cases can often be correctly interpreted if valid methods and strategies 
are used for likelihood comparisons); Micaela Poetsch et al., The New 
Powerplex® ESX17 and ESI17 Kits in Paternity and Maternity Analyses 
Involving People from Africa—Including Allele Frequencies for Three African 
Populations, 125 INT’L J. LEGAL MED. 149 (2011) (finding that since mostly 
only one parent and one or more children are tested with <15 short tandem 
repeats (STRs) analysis, the occurrence of possible mutational events has to be 
interpreted with great care and may lead to difficult or erroneous conclusions); 
Daniel Kling et al., DNA Microarray as a Tool in Establishing Genetic 
Relatedness—Current Status and Future Prospects, 6 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: 
GENETICS 322 (2012) (noting that the choice of markers is at present in forensic 
genetics mostly limited to STRs, due to their high variability and their ability to 
provide a high power of discrimination, and also that STRs have a high mutation 
rate). 
7 See, e.g., Evelyn Sahli, Diffusion of DNA Testing in the Immigration Process 82 
(Dec. 2009) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), available at 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=30647(quoting one expert who thinks that 
DNA testing early in the process would save money and time in file movement 
and storage, interviews, and investigations, and would enable applicants and 
petitioners to avoid the cost of procuring, translating and delivering fraudulent 
documents in an attempt to meet the documentary requirement when no 
legitimate document is available). 
8 See, e.g., Sean Webby, DNA Evidence Links Man to Stabbing Deaths of Mother 
and Toddler, MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 5, 2008, 1:42AM), http://www.myspace
.com/bayareamissing/blog/344627615 (discussing how a Vietnamese refugee 
was arrested sixteen years later for murder after DNA from California’s State 
DNA Index System (SDIS) database matched blood collected at the crime 
scene). See also Samantha Maiden, Biometric Security at Borders, SUNDAY 
TELEGRAPH (Austl.) (Apr. 1, 2012, 12:00AM), http://www.dailytelegraph
.com.au/news/biometric-security-at-borders-to-catch-visa-fraud/story-e6freuy9-
1226315240076 (discussing how sharing of refugees’ biometric information 
with authorities in other jurisdictions led to the deportation of an asylum seeker 
in Australia who was a registered sex offender in the U.S. and Germany). 
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Despite these purported benefits, mandatory DNA testing carries 
significant and arguably detrimental sociopolitical and legal impacts. 
With full faith in the objectivity of science and technology, the new 
policy creates epistemic and ontological shifts whereby the truth of 
identity and family relation may no longer lie in words spoken or texts 
written or images materialized on paper, but instead, in tests done on 
the body. The refugee’s statement, “He is my son,” may carry little 
weight compared to the cotton swab rubbed against the inner cheek. 
The refugee’s body has become a site of evidence where truth lies and 
fraud lurks. “Family” has regressed from relational understanding to 
biological, corporeal understanding. The policy, in a real sense, takes 
us back to blood.9 
The us is extraterritorially inclusive, for it involves the 
materialization of a collective, transnational effort among developed 
countries to harmonize an immigration and refugee law that 
emphasizes humanitarian principles while rendering invisible 
ideological rationales. The U.S. and many other countries use DNA 
tests to establish biological identity for family reunification in 
immigration and refugee law.10 In the U.S., DNA testing is offered to 
immigrants on a “voluntary”11 basis, serving as a last resort measure to 
                                                            
9 DNA testing often does not require a blood sample, but instead can be done with 
a buccal swab to collect cells on the inside of a cheek. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, 9 FAM 42.44 N2(a) (2012) [hereinafter 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL]. I use the phrase “back to blood” not as a literal 
(and thus inaccurate) interpretation of DNA testing. Rather, it serves as a 
metaphor in the immigration and refugee context for an emerging state of affairs 
where governments impose a molecular gaze on a person that causes a return to 
our most primal understandings of familial relationships: those that exist only 
through immediate blood relationships. “Black to blood” is borrowed from TOM 
WOLFE, BACK TO BLOOD: A NOVEL (2012). 
10 See, e.g., Encarnación La Spina, DNA Testing for Family Reunification in 
Europe: An Exceptional Resource?, 6 MIGRACIONES INTERNACIONALES 39 
(2012); Torsten Heinemann & Thomas Lemke, Suspect Families: DNA Kinship 
Testing in German Immigration Policy, 47 SOCIOLOGY 810, 811 (2013), 
available at http://soc.sagepub.com/content/47/4/810 (“Today, at least 20 
countries around the world (including 16 European countries) have incorporated 
parental testing into decision-making on family reunification in immigration 
cases: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, the UK, and the USA.”). 
11 But see N.C. Aizenman, DNA Testing a Mixed Bag for Immigrants, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 25, 2006, at A1 (quoting Alison Brown, an immigration lawyer: 
“What’s troubling is that it seems like the availability of DNA testing is leading 
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verify an “alleged biological relationship” where “no other credible 
proof such as documentation or photos of the relationship exists.”12 
Because all persons with blood relations share a similar sequence of 
DNA, comparing respective DNA material can establish genetic 
relationships with an extremely high level of accuracy.13 
While the putative main goal of DNA testing in family 
reunification matters is proven certainty of a stated relationship,14 this 
certainty may also cause more distrust among immigration officials, 
not to mention family members themselves. Identity documents—the 
written and visual texts, and the spoken word of the applicant—lose 
their power of truth in the face of science. There are various reasons 
for this reliance on genetic truth, but one of the most apparent is the 
post-9/11 climate that has induced a culture of risk and its apparent 
control,15 framed in state sovereignty and national security discourse, 
that has exacerbated the imposition of DNA testing on immigrants and 
refugees. 
In the wake of 9/11, and with the rise of ever-cheaper, ever-faster, 
evermore-accurate DNA technology, we are witnessing the emergence 
of a new order of bio-surveillance and what I call a “hemonomy,” a 
socially constructed system of laws and rules of categorization—
truth/fraud, permitted/denied, secure/insecure—that literally interposes 
a “right of blood” established through DNA testing. This new order 
replaces hitherto pro-capitalist/non-communist immigration and 
refugee law with a securitized and surveilled pro-somatic immigration 
and refugee law. Coupled with this is an eisegetical transformation of 
evidence, where it is no longer the state interpreting immigration 
documents in accordance with the context and meaning of the 
applicant, but rather, the state imposing its interpretation onto the 
applicant’s molecularized, scriptured body. 
                                                                                                                                            
to a greater level of mistrust of identity documents that otherwise would have 
been readily accepted,” and quoting Parastoo Zahedi, another attorney, 
recounting the story of a client: “My son said the official told him very simply, 
‘No DNA test, no visa . . . .’”). 
12 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 9, at N3(b). 
13 Id. at 42.44 N1(b). 
14 Id. at 42.44 N1(a) and (b). 
15 See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL, CRIME AND SOCIAL 
ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001); RICHARD V. ERICSON, CRIME IN AN 
INSECURE WORLD (2007); Holland, supra note 3, at 1669–72. 
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The intersection of genetics and immigration is ripe for systematic 
and empirical exploration by legal scholars and social scientists.16 As 
more countries institute DNA testing in their immigration and refugee 
laws and policies, it is critical to examine how these themes of 
objectivity, neutrality, and fraud reveal themselves. This Article aims 
to undertake these themes. I will focus on the sociopolitical and legal 
implications of Priority Three, which was suspended in 2008 due to 
fraud concerns, but was reinstituted in October 2012 with required 
DNA testing for individuals claiming to be the parent or child of a 
refugee already living in the U.S.17 I argue that this new policy is 
fraught with problems and that extant legal doctrines or frameworks do 
not adequately protect the fundamental human rights of refugees and 
associated family members. 
In Part II of this Article, I will explore current refugee law and 
Priority Three, including the contentious pilot project in 2008 that led 
to its suspension and revival in late 2012. Part III and Part IV will 
critically analyze Priority Three from a sociopolitical and legal 
viewpoint, respectively. The political viewpoint will look at issues 
such as genetic essentialism and the body as a site of evidence. The 
legal viewpoint will look at issues such as informed consent, privacy, 
discrimination, and human rights. Ethical norms will be discussed in 
each. Part V will look towards some alternative solutions to mitigate 
the impact of the new Priority Three policy; Part VI concludes. 
                                                            
16 Torsten Heinemann, Thomas Lemke & Barbara Prainsack, Risky Profiles: 
Societal Dimensions of Forensic Uses of DNA Profiling Technologies, 31 NEW 
GENETICS & SOC’Y 249, 253 (2012) (“The impact of forensic genetics on 
immigration policies and family reunification still remains a non-issue for most 
social scientists . . . [T]he use of parental testing in immigration contexts also 
raises serious concerns that are yet to be studied . . . .”). But see Holland, supra 
note 3 (discussing the policy implications of Priority Three and evaluating the 
science of DNA testing); Villiers, supra note 6 (using examples from U.S. 
criminal, family, and estates and trusts law to offer a policy for the use of DNA 
testing and evidence in immigration law); Martin G. Weiss, Strange DNA: The 
Rise of DNA Analysis for Family Reunification and its Ethical Implications, 7 
GENOMICS, SOC’Y & POL’Y 1 (2011) (discussing broadly the ethical problems 
posed by DNA testing for family reunification); Heinemann & Lemke, supra 
note 10, at 16 (discussing parental DNA testing for family reunification in 
German immigration policy). 
17 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE ET AL., PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FOR FISCAL 
YEAR 2013 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS (2012), available at http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/198157.pdf [hereinafter FY 2013 
Refugee Admissions Report]. See also PRM Press Release, supra note 1. 
474 UMass Law Review v. 8 | 466 
II. CURRENT REFUGEE LAW AND PRIORITY THREE 
A. Current Refugee Law 
Current refugee law is centered in the executive branch but 
coordinated with Congress. The Department of Homeland Security, 
via the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 
and its roving Refugee Corps, determines who may come to the U.S. 
as a refugee.18 Additionally, the President each year designates groups 
of people as refugee-admissible in coordination with the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.19 The State Department’s 
Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (the Bureau) 
coordinates and manages the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, 
which addresses U.S. resettlement policy and programs for the 
admission of refugees.20 Refugee admissions “of special humanitarian 
concern” are determined through the Refugee Admissions Program 
priority system, which is divided into three priority-based processing 
programs.21 
Priority One handles individual cases from persons of any 
nationality with compelling protection needs.22 Priority Two handles 
members of specific groups identified by the State Department, in 
consultation with Homeland Security, USCIS, non-governmental 
organizations, the Commissioner, and other experts, as needing 
resettlement because of special humanitarian concern.23 Priority Three 
handles individual “members of designated nationalities who have 
                                                            
18 The United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) Consultation & 
Worldwide Processing Priorities, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (follow humanitarian hyperlink; then 
follow refugees & asylum hyperlink; then follow refugees hyperlink; then 
follow “USRAP Consultations and Worldwide Processing Priorities” hyperlink) 
(last visited May 2, 2013). 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(3) (2011) [hereinafter 
INA]. 
22 FY 2013 Refugee Admissions Report, supra note 17, at 7. These refugees are 
identified and referred to USRAP by UNHCR, a U.S. embassy, or a designated 
NGO. Id. 
23 Id. at 8. These groups generally are religious or ethnic minorities and constitute 
the majority of refugees admitted to the U.S. Id. 
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immediate family members in the United States who initially entered 
as refugees or were granted asylum.”24 
In Priority Three processing, the family member in the U.S. is 
referred to as the anchor, while the relative overseas is referred to as 
the applicant, who must establish refugee status.25 The applicant files 
an Affidavit of Relationship, which must be submitted to the Refugee 
Processing Center in Arlington, Virginia, via a resettlement agency 
that holds a current cooperative agreement with the Bureau to assist in 
the reception and placement of refugees in the U.S.26 The affidavit is 
logged by the Refugee Processing Center and then sent to Homeland 
Security for review.27 The applicant is allowed to include only certain 
family members, referred to as Qualifying Family Members, namely 
his or her spouse, parents, and unmarried children under twenty-one 
years of age.28 These are derivative beneficiaries that need not 
establish refugee status themselves.29 The Bureau, in consultation with 
Homeland Security through USCIS, establishes a list of nationalities 
eligible for Priority Three processing; this determination is based on a 
finding by the Bureau that the nationality is “of special humanitarian 
                                                            
24 Id. at 11. Accord INA, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(a) (2011). Asylees are individuals 
who are physically present in the United States, and whose claims are 
adjudicated on U.S. soil, whereas refugees are granted refugee status while 
physically present outside the United States. Id. 
25 Anchors are deemed “refugees” and asylees with proof of Form I-94, 
“permanent residents” with proof of Form I-551, Form I-151, or temporary 
proof from USCIS, or “citizens” with proof of passport or naturalization 
certificate. FY 2013 Refugee Admissions Report, supra note 17, at 11. 
26 Id. at 18. 
27 Id. at 11. 
28 Id. at 12. Accord INA, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1157(c)(2)(a)-(b); Holland, supra note 3, at 
1653 (noting the cultural assumption that “an individual who is twenty-one 
years of age or older is expected to fend, legally and otherwise, for himself.” 
Meanwhile in many American households, children can remain dependent on 
their parents long after they reach the age of majority). Qualifying Family 
Members must be living outside of their country of origin or nationality and the 
relationship with the anchor must have existed at the time he or she was granted 
refugee/asylees status. They must be unable to return to their home country, and 
must prove their own refugee claim through an interview process as well. FY 
2013 Refugee Admissions Report, supra note 17, at 12. 
29 FY 2013 Refugee Admissions Report, supra note 17, at 11–12. 
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concern to the U.S. for the purposes of family-reunification refugee 
processing.”30 
B. DNA Testing of Priority Three Refugees and Family 
Members 
Since DNA profiling was first created in 1984,31 advances in 
biotechnology and genetics have led immigration authorities to move 
beyond testimony and government documents32 to establish, with great 
scientific exactitude, whether one family member is genetically 
connected to another. USCIS began exploring the use of DNA testing 
at the start of the new millennium.33 While the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, now USCIS, previously established that it 
could require blood parentage testing,34 a July 14, 2000 memorandum 
to its field offices from Michael D. Cronin, then Acting Executive 
Associate Commissioner of Immigration, stated that no “statutory or 
regulatory authority to require DNA testing” existed.35 It further added 
                                                            
30 Id. at 12. For FY 2013, “P-3 processing will be available to individuals of the 
following nationalities: Afghanistan, Bhutan, Burma, Burundi, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Haiti, Iran, Iraq, Republic of 
Congo, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Uzbekistan, [and] Zimbabwe.” 
Id. at 13. 
31 Alec J. Jeffreys et al., Hypervariable ‘Minisatellite’ Regions in Human DNA, 
314 NATURE 67, 72 (1985). 
32 FY 2013 Refugee Admissions Report, supra note 17, at 11.  
Previously, in order to qualify for access under P-3 procedures, an 
applicant must have been outside of his or her country of origin, 
have had an Affidavit of Relationship (AOR) filed on his or her 
behalf by an eligible ‘anchor’ relative in the United States during a 
period in which the nationality was included on the eligibility list, 
and have been cleared for onward processing by the DHS/USCIS 
Refugee Access Verification Unit. 
 Id. See also 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.2(b)(2)(i), 204.2(d)(2)(v). 
33 Recommendation from the CIS Ombudsman to the Director, USCIS, pt. II, at 1 
(Apr. 12, 2006). 
34 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(d)(2)(vi). The blood testing could be done by means of blood 
parentage testing through Blood Group Antigen (BGA) or Human Leukocyte 
Antigen (HLA). 
35 Memorandum from Michael D. Cronin, Acting Exec. Assoc. Comm’r of the 
Office of Programs, U.S. Dept. of Justice, HQADN 70/11, Guidance on 
Parentage Testing for Family-Based Immigrant Visa Petitions 2 (July 14, 2000) 
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that “no parentage testing, including DNA testing, is 100 percent 
conclusive,” and that due to the “expense, complexity and logistical 
problems . . . and sensitivity inherent in parentage testing,” field 
offices “should be extremely cautious” when suggesting DNA 
testing.36 
Nonetheless, the memo clearly permitted the use of DNA testing 
when the applicant did not satisfy the evidentiary threshold to establish 
a parental relationship and the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
would otherwise deny the petition without more conclusive evidence.37 
And, despite the warnings in the first part of the memo, the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service appeared to tout DNA 
testing’s benefits in the latter part.38 For example, the memo stated that 
testing “can be an extremely valuable tool when it otherwise would be 
impossible to verify a relationship,” and that because parentage testing 
is an extremely fact-driven procedure, field officers providing 
laboratories “with suspicions of fraud or other pertinent facts” could 
help render a more accurate answer.39 The memo also stated that DNA 
testing, involving potentially only a buccal swab, was less intrusive 
than traditional blood tests and could be more easily done in countries 
with limited medical and transportation facilities as there was no need 
to use live human blood cells.40 
A sustained push for required DNA testing began in 2006, when 
Prakash Khatri, the USCIS Ombudsman, recommended to Emilio T. 
González, then-Director of USCIS, that if USCIS officers “doubt[ed] 
the authenticity of relationship documents, and/or the legitimacy of the 
relationships for which they are submitted as evidence,” they could 
require DNA testing “to verify the legitimacy of claimed family 
relationships.”41 The Khatri memorandum emphasized that “[f]amily 
                                                                                                                                            
[hereinafter Cronin Memorandum] (reprinted in 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 
1096, 1096 (July 31, 2000)). 
36 Id. at 2; See also Holland, supra note 3, at 1645. 
37 Cronin Memorandum, supra note 35, at 3. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 2. 
40 Id. at 4. 
41 Letter from Prakash Khatri, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
Ombudsman, to Emilio T. González, Dir., USCIS at 1–4 (Apr. 12, 2006), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/CISOmbudsman_RR_26_DNA-
04-13-06.pdf [hereinafter Khatri memorandum]. The memorandum 
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reunification is a pillar of U.S. immigration policy,” but added that 
“USCIS must be able to verify, and its customers must be able to 
establish, that the claimed family relationships that constitute the basis 
of eligibility for immigration benefits are legitimate.”42 DNA testing 
was touted as a benefit for all parties, specifically in terms of improved 
national security, customer service, and efficiency, and as a policy 
proposal that could be tested in a pilot study.43 However, there was no 
discussion of ethical, legal, or social risks. 
USCIS and the Bureau announced in February 2008 that it had 
launched a compulsory DNA testing pilot project in Nairobi, Kenya, to 
DNA test 500 refugee applicants primarily from Somalia and 
Ethiopia.44 The reason for this location was due to “frequent reports 
and anecdotal information that there was widespread fraud” in Priority 
                                                                                                                                            
recommended amending 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.2(d)(2)(v-vi), the latter of which 
would read in part: 
DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) or Genetic Testing. The director 
may require that DNA or genetic testing be conducted to verify an 
alleged biological relationship. Tests will be conducted by an 
approved laboratory accredited by the American Association of 
Blood Banks (AABB) using the Polymerase Chain Reaction-Short 
Tandem Repeat (PCR-STR) test or Restriction Fragment Length 
Polymorphism (RFLP) test, or other test that the Service 
determines has been accepted by the scientific community as 
achieving or surpassing the qualities of these tests .. . . Refusal to 
submit to DNA testing when requested may constitute a basis for 
denial of the petition, unless a legitimate medical or religious 
objection has been established. When a legitimate medical or 
religious objection is established, alternate forms of evidence may 
be considered based upon documentation already submitted. 
Khatri memorandum, supra at 6. 
To require DNA or genetic testing to “verify an alleged biological relationship” 
vastly broadens the scope of relationships as currently expressed in 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.2(d)(2)(vi), which states that “[t]he director may require that a specific 
Blood Group Antigen Test be conducted of the beneficiary and the beneficiary’s 
father and mother.” 
42 Khatri memorandum, supra note 41, at 3. 
43 Id. at 5. 
44 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, FRAUD IN THE REFUGEE FAMILY REUNIFICATION 
PROGRAM FACTSHEET 2 (FEB. 3, 2009), available at http://www.state.gov/j/
prm/releases/factsheets/2009/181066.htm [hereinafter FRAUD IN THE REFUGEE 
FAMILY]; ESBENSHADE, ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 10. 
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Three processing, “particularly in Kenya.”45 The pilot program later 
expanded to other parts of Africa and eventually totaled 3,000 tested 
refugees.46 The pilot project revealed that USCIS and the Bureau were 
only able to confirm “all claimed biological relationships” in fewer 
than twenty percent of tested family units,47 though the conception of 
“fraud” deployed by USCIS and the Bureau is suspect,48 and scholars 
have noted that the pilot study’s methodology was seriously flawed.49 
Further, USCIS and the Bureau did not consider that serious 
psychological and social impacts could result from requiring such 
tests, or that USCIS field officers were not trained in psychological or 
genetic counseling.50 USCIS and the Bureau have never released the 
underlying statistics, making it impossible to determine to what extent 
true fraud existed. Nevertheless, the pilot project results led to the 
eventual suspension of the entire Priority Three program in October 
2008.51 
                                                            
45 FRAUD IN THE REFUGEE FAMILY, supra note 44, at 2. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 See generally Jill Esbenshade, Discrimination, DNA Testing, and Dispossession: 
Consequences of U.S. Policy for African Refugees, 13 SOULS 175, 186 (2011) 
[hereinafter Esbenshade, Discrimination]. In any case where one or more family 
members did not appear at an interview or one or more family members refused 
to provide a sample for any reason, including privacy concerns (refusals and no-
shows constituted the “great majority” of cases, according to the State 
Department), or where the results indicated that one or more relationships was 
different from the claim, the whole family unit was deemed fraudulent. USCIS 
and PRM also did not consider that undisclosed rapes (a common occurrence 
among refugee women) and infidelities may have discouraged women from 
agreeing to the test. See also Lauren Zwaans, Church Fights DNA Tests for 
Refugees, THE ADVERTISER (Austl.), Nov. 16, 2009, at 28 (reporting that an 
estimated 75 percent of Sierra Leonean refugee women have been raped since 
the civil war began in the early 1990s). 
49 See ESBENSHADE, ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 11–12. Refugees were 
apparently asked without forewarning in their interviews to provide a DNA 
sample to test for relationships between the primary applicant and his or her 
derivative relatives (rather than the “anchor” in the U.S., as there was 
uncertainty about the legality of testing on U.S. soil). Some refugees were also 
apparently told that DNA testing was voluntary, which impacted the “fraud” 
determination. Id. at 17 n.20. 
50 Esbenshade, Discrimination, supra note 48, at 187. 
51 FRAUD IN THE REFUGEE FAMILY, supra note 44. 
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In September 2010, the State Department published proposed rules 
(the Notice) requiring DNA testing of future Priority Three 
applicants.52 The Notice stated that a revised Affidavit of Relationship, 
now an official State Department form, rather than an informal 
petition, would inform the anchor relative “that DNA evidence of all 
claimed parent-child relations between the anchor relative and parents 
and/or unmarried children under [twenty-one] will be required as a 
condition of access to P–3 processing.”53 It did not state whether DNA 
testing of derivative beneficiaries would be required as well. The 
Notice stated that the costs would be borne by the anchor relative or 
their family members or derivative beneficiaries, but that successful 
applicants could be eligible for reimbursement of DNA test costs.54 
The FY 2013 Refugee Admissions Report released in October 
2012 stated that the U.S. Refugees Admissions Program would resume 
Priority Three processing with a newly approved Affidavit of 
Relationship Form55 that contained “new language about penalties for 
committing fraud; and alerts filers that DNA evidence of certain 
claimed biological parent-child relationships will be required in order 
to gain access to an Immigration Service’s interview for refugee 
admission to the United States through the P-3 program.”56 In a press 
release dated October 4, 2012, the Bureau stated that “DNA 
relationship testing will occur between the anchor and his/her claimed 
biological parents, and between the anchor and his/her claimed 
biological children.”57 Applicants must pay all DNA testing costs, 
which are currently estimated at $440 for the first person and $220 for 
                                                            
52 60-Day Notice of Proposed Information Collection: DS-7656; Affidavit of 
Relationship (AOR); OMB Control Number 1405-XXXX, 75 Fed. Reg. 54, 
690–91 (Sept. 8, 2010). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 See Form DS-7656 at 3, available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
PRAViewIC?ref_nbr=201111-1405-010&icID=200164 [hereinafter Form DS-
7656]. 
56 FY 2013 Refugee Admissions Report, supra note 17, at 12. The revised Form 
DS-7656 states that criminal prosecutions may be sought when family 
relationships are falsified to obtain immigration benefits. Form DS-7656, supra 
note 55. 
57 PRM Press Release, supra note 1, at 2. 
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each additional test;58 an expensive sum for many refugee families. 
According to the Bureau, applicants will be reimbursed “only if all 
claimed and tested biological relationships are confirmed by DNA test 
results,”59 and the reimbursement amount paid is subject to available 
funds from the International Organization for Migration, which 
manages the reimbursement process.60 
It appears that DNA testing will be done using cells collected from 
a buccal swab.61 The DNA of anchors is tested by an American 
Association of Blood Banks (AABB) approved laboratory in the U.S., 
while the DNA of Qualifying Family Members is tested by an 
embassy-appointed panel physician62 or by the International 
Organization for Migration.63 Persons who undergo DNA testing 
direct the laboratory conducting the test to send a paper report directly 
to the Refugee Processing Center.64 The Affidavit of Relationship 
Form DS-7656 and results of the DNA test are sent to USCIS for an 
initial review of claimed relationships by the Refugee Access 
Verification Unit. Following completion of the Refugee Access 
Verification Unit review,65 the Refugee Processing Center notifies the 
Resettlement Support Center whether case processing can continue.66 
                                                            
58 See Minnesota Dep’t of Health, Refugee Health Quarterly (Oct. 2012), available 
at http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/idepc/refugee/rhq/rhqoct12.pdf 
[hereinafter Refugee Health Quarterly]. See also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE RAPID DNA SYSTEM  (2013), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy/PIAs
/privacy-pia-rapiddna-20130208.pdf [hereinafter RAPID DNA SYSTEM PIA]. 
59 PRM Press Release, supra note 1, at 2 (emphasis in original). 
60 Id. 
61 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, WORLDWIDE REFUGEE ADMISSIONS PROCESSING SYSTEM 
(WRAPS) PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT 4, available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/101146.pdf [hereinafter WRAPS PIA] (“A parent-child 
DNA laboratory test costs more than $400, with additional child verifications 
costing $150 each.”). See also RAPID DNA SYSTEM PIA, supra note 58. See also 
RAPID DNA SYSTEM PIA, supra note 58, at 2 (describing the development of a 
Rapid DNA System portable testing device for “rapid family relationship 
verification” by way of buccal swabs). 
62 Id. (A panel physician is a medically trained, licensed, and experienced doctor 
practicing overseas who is appointed by the local U.S. embassy or consulate.). 
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III. THE SOCIOPOLITICS OF REFUGEE DNA TESTING AND FAMILY 
IDENTITY 
The Khatri memorandum identified three benefits of DNA testing 
to prove a family relationship: national security (deterrence of fraud), 
customer service (diminishing requests for further evidence and 
interviews), and USCIS efficiency (putative scientific conclusiveness 
of DNA testing allows USCIS to reduce adjudication time and expense 
and reallocate resources to other important activities such backlog 
reduction and prevention).67 References to risk, such as the “sensitivity 
inherent in parentage testing” and the need for caution when 
suggesting, or now requiring, DNA testing, as expressed in the Cronin 
memorandum, disappeared. The benefits of DNA testing will be 
critiqued in Part III and Part IV, and the many previously neglected 
risks will be explored. This section also examines the sociopolitical 
implications of required DNA testing and its potentially detrimental 
impact on refugees as individuals and members of a family unit. 
A. The Meaning of Family 
The primary issue in DNA testing of refugees and family members 
to determine the legitimacy of claimed relationships is what constitutes 
a family. Though no universal definition is possible, a family can be 
recognized as the “natural and fundamental group unit of society.”68 A 
family is a unit critical for the continuance of culture, that is, the 
customs, values, beliefs, religion, and language of a community, and 
the sustainability of society itself because family facilitates the health 
and development of future generations and provides for human 
flourishing.69 For U.S. immigration and refugee law, family is often 
constricted into the confines of nuclear family, consisting of one 
husband, one wife, and their genetically related children.70 In itself, 
                                                            
67 Khatri memorandum, supra note 41, at 5. 
68 G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc. A/RES/217 (III) at 79 (Dec. 10, 1948) 
[hereinafter UDHR]; G.A. Res, 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 22nd Sess., Supp. 
No 16, U.N. Doc A/6316 at art. 23 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR 1966]. 
69 See Brooke Wilmsen, Family Separation: The Policies, Procedures, and 
Consequences for Refugee Background Families, 30 REFUGEE SURVEY Q. 44 
(2011). 
70 Zvi Triger, Introducing the Political Family: A New Road Map for Critical 
Family Law, 13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 361, 365 (2012) (discussing the 
nineteenth century appearance of the phrase “nuclear family,” how only in the 
seventeenth century did the word “family” begin to connote a social unit that 
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this is not a radical tenet. Many cultures understand the construct of a 
nuclear family. Yet a nuclear family is very much a socially 
constructed symbol that imparts an array of questions as to who and 
what qualifies as husband, wife, and child.71 Family is above all a 
dynamic, culturally specific category that may also have sub-cultural 
specificities. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
recognizes family’s socially constructed meaning: 
The UNHCR definition [of family for the purposes of resettlement] 
also includes persons who may be dependent on the family unit, 
particularly economically, but also socially or emotionally 
dependent. This includes children who have reached 18 years of 
age or who are married (if they remain in the family unit) or 
children or older people under foster care or guardianship 
arrangements, but are not biologically related.72 
Indeed, for some cultures, marriage or its equivalent will establish 
a family, whereas for others, emphasis may be placed more on 
dependency or genetics. Yet even within these categories, there is a 
constellation of interpretations based on cultural factors and 
experiences, not only across the globe, but also within the U.S. For 
refugees, whose lives have been ripped apart by war and strife, the 
family unit may well be in a state of perpetual flux, constantly being 
created or recreated, with members coming and going. In many ways 
refugees epitomize the denuclearized family.73 
For example, although U.S. immigration and refugee policy 
stipulates that children who are not genetically related may still be 
admitted to the U.S. through the Priority Three provided they are 
                                                                                                                                            
contains a father, a mother and children, and anthropological research showing 
that the multiple-parent model, called “alloparenting,” was the dominant 
parenting model among early hominids). 
71 Id. 
72 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Challenges and Opportunities in Family 
Reunification, Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement, Geneva, 
UNHCR, 2008, at 2–3, available at http://www.unhcr.org/4fbcf9619.pdf. 
73 See, e.g., Laila Tingvold et al., Parents and Children Only? Acculturation and 
the Influence of Extended Family Members Among Vietnamese Refugees, 36 
INT’L J. INTERCULTURAL REL. 260 (2012) (qualitative study of Vietnamese 
refugee children in Norway revealing that aunts, uncles, and cousins are 
experienced as significant persons in the lives of many adolescents). See also 
Esther Sample, State Practice and the Family Unity of African Refugees, 28 
FORCED MIGRATION REV. 51 (2007) (finding that in her field work in African 
refugee camps, high mortality often causes denuclearized family groupings). 
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legally adopted,74 the western conception of legal adoption is 
prohibited in certain regions or cultures, such as classical Islamic law 
and its concept of tabanni.75 The closest equivalent in this legal system 
and culture is kafala, which involves physical custody of children, but 
the child is not treated like a birth child in many important regards and 
the system does not allow for rights of inheritance or other rights and 
responsibilities that biological children and parents may have.76 
Many cultures also equate family with extended networks of 
relatives and clan structures. This is especially true in Somalia, the site 
of the pilot DNA test project in 2008, and other regions of Africa 
where “fostering of children by non-parental kin is prevalent”77 for 
multiple reasons, including death, divorce, and the consequences of 
refugees’ plights whereby dynamic families are created by choice or 
circumstance rather than biology.78 Anthropologist Christine Oppong 
also notes that a large number of kin can belong to a small number of 
categories in kinship systems, such that a father can refer to an uncle 
and a mother can refer to an aunt.79 Similarly, Marshall Sahlins, an 
anthropologist who has extensively studied kinship systems, comments 
that even notions of biological and genetic family ties are opaque and 
are themselves tied to the social: 
[W]here they are relevant, the blood, milk, semen, bone, flesh, 
spirit, or whatever of procreation are not simply physiological 
                                                            
74 Form DS-7656, supra note 55, at 1 (“In order to be claimed on this 
AOR . . . adopted children must have been in the legal custody of and resided 
with the adopting parent or parents for at least two years and legally adopted 
before their 16th birthday.”). 
75 See Kristen Stilt & Swathi Gandhavadi, The Strategies of Muslim Family Law 
Reform 14 (Northwestern U. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research 
Paper Series, No. 11-42) (Feb. 9, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1802757. 
76 Id. at 14–15. 
77 Esbenshade, Discrimination, supra note 48, at 185. 
78 Taitz and colleagues note that 58 percent of Somalis given DNA testing by the 
Danish Immigration Service between January 1997 and September 1998 
received a negative (non-matching) result. According to Somali community 
leaders, the finding was unsurprising: “The concept of family is very different in 
[the Somali] culture, and many Somalis are not aware of the Danish concept of 
who is a family member and thereby entitled to family reunification.” See Jackie 
Taitz et al., The Last Resort: Exploring the Use of DNA Testing for Family 
Reunification, 6 HEALTH & HUMAN RTS. 20, 26–27 (2002). 
79 Esbenshade, Discrimination, supra note 48, at 186. 
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phenomena nor do they belong to the parents alone. They are 
meaningful social endowments that situate the child in a broadly 
extended and specifically structured field of kin relationships. 
Through such substances, the child is ipso facto connected to wider 
circles of paternal and maternal relatives—let alone all those 
implicated when conception also involves bestowals from ancestral 
beings. So again, ‘biological’ relations being social relations, in 
such cases the nexus of so-called extended kinship is already in the 
composition of the foetus.80 
Social science-informed studies indicate that equating the parent-child 
or sibling relationship as strictly biological (read: genetic) glosses over 
the multiple nuances and meanings of family.81 Ethnographic studies 
suggest that many refugee families are the result of fragmented 
circumstances,82 and far from knowingly committing fraud, many 
parents may be shocked to learn that a child is not in fact genetically 
related.83 
DNA testing to establish a claimed biological relationship, seen in 
this light, becomes so convoluted as to paradoxically increase the 
“scientific certainty” of one person having nearly identical DNA to 
another person, and also render meaningless the underlying human 
bond it tests. A DNA test can reveal that a genetic relationship exists 
between two people with greater than 99.5 percent accuracy for 
parent-child,84 but the revelation of “truth” constricts the ontology of 
family, ignores the traumatic refugee context, and indeed conceals 
family as a socially constructed phenomenon insusceptible to techno-
scientific interpretation. As Emily Holland comments, “DNA testing 
cannot appreciate the refugee family or the refugee experience, 
                                                            
80 Marshall Sahlins, Birth is the Metaphor, 18 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 
673, 674 (2012). See also MARSHALL SAHLINS, WHAT KINSHIP IS—AND IS NOT 
(2013). 
81 Lica Tomizuka, The Supreme Court’s Blind Pursuit of Outdated Definitions of 
Familial Relationships in Upholding the Constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1409 in 
Nguyen v. INS, 20 LAW & INEQ. 275, 292–96 (2002) (discussing the changing 
sociological and legal definitions of “mother” and “father”). 
82 Wilmsen, supra note 69. 
83 Taitz et al., supra note 78, at 26 (discussing example of a family from Nairobi 
who were shocked to discover that a child they thought was theirs was not 
biologically related to either the mother or father; the parents apparently 
mistakenly reclaimed the child after years of separation due to civil war). 
84 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 9, at N1(b). 
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because DNA neither detects nor reflects the harsh realities that 
refugees face.”85 
B. When DNA Testing Destructs Familial Inclusion86 
The notion of marriage is fluid in many non-American cultures, 
and is changing in American culture as well. It may not entail a 
contractual arrangement with one other person of the opposite sex. 
Indeed, it may entail same-sex partnerships or arrangements with 
multiple spouses. For instance, polygamy exists in many Muslim and 
African countries, including some of those in Priority Three.87 
Polyandry, where a woman takes two or more husbands at the same 
time, accounts for up to one-third of all marriages (in the westernized 
conception) in Africa and is in fact increasing in urban cities and by 
the choice of women, who may view it as a means of extended support 
and freedom of movement.88 Such fluidity finds dissonance in U.S. 
refugee law, a locus of cultural friction where differing interpretations 
of relationships result in the construction or deconstruction of 
categories. This is evidenced in the category of spouse. 
                                                            
85 Holland, supra note 3, at 1651. 
86 Id. 
87 See, e.g., MIRIAM KOKTVEDGAARD ZEITZEN, POLYGAMY: A CROSS-CULTURAL 
ANALYSIS 157, 201–02 (2008) (discussing the widespread practice of polygamy 
in sub-Saharan Africa); Nadjma Yassari & Mohammed Hamid Saboory, Sharia 
and National Law in Afghanistan, in SHARIA INCORPORATED: A COMPARATIVE 
OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF TWELVE MUSLIM COUNTRIES IN PAST 
AND PRESENT 305–06 (Jan Michiel Otto ed., 2010) (noting that in Afghanistan, 
polygamy is permissible and seen as less of a social stigma than divorce); I. E. 
Pogrebov, Prevalence and Assessment of Polygamy in Uzbekistan, 47 RUSS. 
SOC. SCI. REV. 57, 58 (2006) (noting that in Uzbekistan, polygamy has become 
widespread); Elizabeth Heger Boyle & Ahmed Ali, Culture, Structure, and the 
Refugee Experience in Somali Immigrant Family Transformation, 48 INT’L 
MIGRATION 47, 49 (2009) (noting that the illegality of polygamy in U.S. 
immigration and refugee law “forces some [Somali] refugees to make changes 
in family structure and renegotiate family roles”). See generally Claire A. 
Smearman, Second Wives’ Club: Mapping the Impact of Polygamy in U.S. 
Immigration Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L LAW 382, 383 (2009) (noting that 
“polygamy has been a bar to admission to the United States since the 
Immigration Act of 1891”). 
88 Ifi Amadiume, Family and Culture in Africa, in A COMPANION TO GENDER 
STUDIES 357, 364 (Philomena Essed et al. eds., 2009). 
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USCIS follows U.S. state family and criminal laws in recognizing 
only one contractually created spousal relationship at one time.89 To 
sanction polygamous arrangements in the immigration and refugee 
context but not the domestic context would be poor policy and 
lawmaking. Yet the assumption in American immigration and refugee 
law that there can be only two parents of a child is contrary to 
developments in domestic law, such as family law,90 which also allows 
for more a liberal view towards non-biological parents. In traditional 
English common law, Lord Mansfield’s Rule stipulated that a husband 
obtained paternity of a child born to his wife during the marriage, 
regardless of actual paternity.91 Though the strict rule has been 
overturned in the U.S.,92 family law statutes, court decisions, and 
policies still often presume paternity in order to preserve familial and 
social stability and achieve equitable outcomes.93 Even with DNA 
testing, family law uses doctrines such as equitable adoption and 
estoppel to prevent a parent from neglecting his or her duty to support 
a non-biological child.94 
Courts will also invoke the Constitution to grant recognition of 
non-biological family members in the U.S. In Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, the Supreme Court held that a city ordinance restricting 
housing to a single nuclear family unconstitutionally denied protection 
to a grandmother as it violated the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.95 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, 
wrote that, “Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the 
                                                            
89 See e.g., 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(35) (“The terms ‘spouse’, ‘wife’, or ‘husband’ do 
not include a spouse, wife, or husband by reason of any marriage ceremony 
where the contracting parties thereto are not physically present in the presence 
of each other, unless the marriage shall have been consummated”). See also 
Form DS-7656, supra note 55; Form I-730, Refugee/Asylee Relative Petition, 
available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-730.pdf, which use “spouse” in 
the singular; Smearman, supra note 87. 
90 See, e.g., In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856 (Ct. App. 2011) (finding that child 
had three presumed parents). 
91 Jack v. Jack, 796 S.W.2d 543, 547 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (citing Goodnight v. 
Moss, 98 Eng.Rep. 1257, 1258 (1777)). 
92 Serafin v. Serafin, 258 N.W.2d 461, 462 (Mich. 1977). 
93 Villiers, supra note 6, at 262 (citing Melanie P. Jacobs, My Two Dads: 
Disaggregating Biological and Social Paternity, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809, 855 
(2006)); See also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a) (2002). 
94 Villiers, supra note 6, at 262–63. 
95 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 511–12 (1977). 
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bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family. The tradition of 
uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a 
household along with parents and children has roots equally venerable 
and equally deserving of constitutional recognition.”96 
Courts will also invoke the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to overturn statutes that deny U.S. parents the 
opportunity to develop a parent-child relationship. For example, the 
Arizona Court of Appeals held that a biological mother was 
unconstitutionally denied the ability to prove her legal maternity in a 
surrogate parentage statute, whereas biological fathers had presumed 
legal paternity.97 Agreeing with the trial court’s concern that the 
“current law could leave a child without any mother,”98 the Court held 
that a mother genetically related to a child should have the equal 
opportunity to prove her legal maternity and develop the parent-child 
relationship.99 
Even though courts will often look towards biology to establish 
filiation, parental intent and conduct can also, in certain instances, 
carry strong evidential weight.100 For example, in K.M. v. E.G., the 
Supreme Court of California held that a woman who donated her eggs 
so that her former lesbian partner could bear children through in vitro 
fertilization was a parent of those children, even though she signed a 
consent form relinquishing any future claims or responsibilities to the 
children.101 The Court held that intent governed: a “woman who 
supplies ova to be used to impregnate her lesbian partner, with the 
understanding that the resulting child will be raised in their joint home, 
cannot waive her responsibility to support that child . . . [or] relinquish 
her parental rights.”102 
                                                            
96 Id. at 504. 
97 Soos v. Super. Ct. ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 897 P.2d 1356, 1361 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1994); see also J.R. v. Utah, 261 F.Supp.2d 1268, 1296 (D. Utah, 2002). 
98 Soos, 897 P.2d at 1358. 
99 Id. 
100 See, e.g., Steven v. Matthew, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535, 539 (Ct. App. 1995) (for the 
purposes of custody and visitation rights, a child’s social relationship with a 
non-biological father can trump the relationship with his biological father). 
There are problems associated with an intent-based approach to parentage, such 
as proving intention and the potential for a “battle of the intents” where parents 
may have conflicting “true” intents. 
101 K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 675 (Cal. 2005). 
102 Id. at 682. 
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Whether through intent and conduct, equitable estoppel, or another 
doctrine, courts and legislators are demonstrably comfortable with 
letting equity and sociological understandings of the family trump 
genetics and biological understandings if it is in the best interests of 
the child and promotes family unity and social stability. But for family 
members seeking reunification under Priority Three, judicially-
enforced protections under the Constitution are limited. Immigration 
and refugee law is within the purview of Congress, not the judiciary, 
and the rights of non-U.S. citizens, especially refugees abroad, are 
restricted.103 The double standard used to determine a family—by 
applying a culturally homogenous, monogamous, genetic conception 
of family on refugees, while U.S. family law applies a more flexible, 
liberal conception to its “own” families—perverts principles of 
cultural diversity, dignity, human rights, and fundamental freedoms 
applicable to all persons.104 The disruption of the family unit is one of 
the most disturbing outcomes of the revised Priority Three. Another 
troubling outcome is the emergence of the refugee’s body as a site of 
                                                            
103 See discussion infra Part 4B. Non-U.S. citizens within U.S. territory possess 
certain rights. See David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same 
Constitutional Rights as Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367, 369 (2003) 
(“In particular, foreign nationals are generally entitled to the equal protection of 
the laws, to political freedoms of speech and association, and to due process 
requirements of fair procedure where their lives, liberty, or property are at 
stake.”). However, refugees not on U.S. soil have few rights. See Brian G. 
Slocum, The War on Terrorism and the Extraterritorial Application of the 
Constitution in Immigration Law, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1023 (2007). 
[A]n alien seeking admission to the United States requests a 
privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application, 
for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign 
prerogative . . . [H]owever, once an alien gains admission to our 
country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent 
residence his constitutional status changes accordingly.  
Id. (citing Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982)). 
104 U.N. ESCO, 33d Sess., 33 C/Resolution 15, at 77 (Oct. 3–21, 2005), available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001461/146180e.pdf [hereinafter 
Bioethics Declaration] (“The importance of cultural diversity and pluralism 
should be given due regard. However, such considerations are not to be invoked 
to infringe upon human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms . . . .”). 
See also Jan Helge Solbakk, Fortress Europe: DNA-testing, Ethics and Family 
Reunification, GLOBALISING EUROPEAN BIOETHICS EDUCATION PAPERS, 
available at http://www.gleube.eu/papers/fortress-europe-dna-testing-ethics.htm. 
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evidence to be read by those holding power over whether an 
application should be approved. 
C. The Body as a Site of Evidence and Truth, and Genetic 
Scripture Eisegesis 
The geneticization105 of the family is a consequence of genetic 
essentialism, a belief that “reduces the self to a molecular entity, 
equating human beings, in all their social, historical, and moral 
complexity, with their genes.”106 It is pronounced in the immigration 
and refugee context. While biomedical and social sciences have 
demonstrated that human beings are complex entities coproduced by 
biology, society, culture, and the environment, the uninhibited 
adoption of required DNA testing by the state to establish biological 
family relationship risks making the refugee’s body the primary 
determinant of truth, understanding, and existence. 
When DNA becomes the essential condition for establishing a 
“legitimate” child, spouse, or parent, it crosses the boundary of science 
and technology into a cultural narrative of acceptable pillars of 
identity. Those whose bodies reveal untruth are deemed by the state to 
be socially illegitimate and unacceptable for family reunification. This 
imposed fractionalizing of the refugee family unit, re-victimizing of 
refugees, dehumanizing of identity, and spiraling down to the 
molecular level reflects more than all else entrenched psychological 
biases to etiologically make sense of complex sociopolitical worlds.107 
Reductions to the molecular level flatten irreducible complexities and 
simultaneously encourage an eisegetical interpretation of genetic 
scripture where life’s complex problems, such as determining who 
belongs to a family, are amenable to genetic solutions. 
                                                            
105 Abby Lippman, Prenatal Genetic Testing and Screening: Constructing Needs 
and Reinforcing Inequities, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 15 (1991). See also Henk 
A.M.J. ten Have, Genetics and Culture: The Geneticization Thesis, 4 MED., 
HEALTH CARE & PHIL. 295 (2001). 
106 DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE AS A 
CULTURAL ICON 2 (2004); Holland, supra note 3, at 1654. 
107 Ilan Dar-Nimrod & Steven J. Heine, Genetic Essentialism: On the Deceptive 
Determinism of DNA, 137 PSYCHOL. BULL. 800 (2011). See also Eric Luis 
Uhlmann et al., Blood is Thicker: Moral Spillover Effects Based on Kinship, 124 
COGNITION 239, 242 (2012); Johannes Keller, In Genes We Trust: The 
Biological Component of Psychological Essentialism and Its Relationship to 
Mechanisms of Motivated Social Cognition, 88 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 686 (2005). 
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Anthropologists Didier Fassin and Miriam Ticktin have each noted 
that European and American immigration authorities are now looking 
to the body, rather than words, as the main source of truth and 
legibility.108 This is a biopolitical frame distinct from that of 
sociologists Nikolas Rose and Carlos Novas, whose work describes a 
new world of the “political economy of hope” and the “biological 
citizen” who individualizes health action and responsibility and sees 
biology as manipulable.109 For refugees and family members subject to 
required DNA testing, their somatic self is not open to shaping and 
reshaping; their biology is indeed destiny. It is a “central field of 
action” and “one of the few sources of value” for refugees.110 Unlike 
the biological citizen and unlike the highly skilled or wealthy 
immigrant, the refugee’s body is rendered immutable so as to be 
deciphered and interpreted in techno-scientific logics by the state. 
Biological measures are seen to reveal the refugee’s very essence. As 
Professor Ticktin writes: 
The body is a source of authentication in situations where the 
subject is conceived as unable to provide a reasoned, spoken 
truth. . . . . [T]ruth for those managed by the humanitarian 
government is similarly found in ‘primordial landscape of the 
racialized body’. . .both designating and producing them as Other, 
as beyond and outside reason. However, the racialized body takes 
shape in new terms, as immutable biology.111 
This essentialist “truth ordeal,”112 where only biological measures 
speak the ultimate truth,113 reflects not just a political economy of hope 
                                                            
108 Miriam Ticktin, How Biology Travels: A Humanitarian Trip, 17 BODY & SOC’Y 
139 (2011) [hereinafter How Biology Travels]. See generally MIRIAM TICKTIN, 
CASUALTIES OF CARE: IMMIGRATION AND THE POLITICS OF HUMANITARIANISM 
IN FRANCE (2011); DIDIER FASSIN, HUMANITARIAN REASON: A MORAL HISTORY 
OF THE PRESENT 109–29 (2012) [hereinafter HUMANITARIAN REASON]. 
109 Nikolas Rose & Carlos Novas, Biological Citizenship, in GLOBAL 
ASSEMBLAGES: TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS, AND ETHICS AS ANTHROPOLOGICAL 
PROBLEMS 439 (Aihwa Ong & Stephen J. Collier eds., 2005). See also NIKOLAS 
ROSE, THE POLITICS OF LIFE ITSELF: BIOMEDICINE, POWER AND SUBJECTIVITY IN 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2007). 
110 How Biology Travels, supra note 108, at 144. 
111 Id. at 153. 
112 HUMANITARIAN REASON, supra note 107, at 109. 
113 How Biology Travels, supra note 108, at 153 (describing how a New York City 
immigration lawyer finds that “[O]ne almost needs to have physical evidence or 
a doctor’s testimony in order to get one’s claim accepted” and “that now that 
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as Professors Rose and Novas describe, but also a hemonomy of fear 
by both refugees and the U.S. government.114 A refugee family must 
place their faith in the techne of science to determine blood lines in 
order to fit into the legally and politically permissible category of 
family. As oral testimony and paper documentation are increasingly 
unsatisfactory evidence of a bona fide relationship, refugees and 
family members are transmogrified into homines sacri115—bare lives 
subject to the political control and biopower of the state. 
Required DNA testing in Priority Three processing produces 
another adverse effect. The long-standing principle of humanitarianism 
is “genewashed” by an eisegetical transformation of evidence. 
Immigration documents may come to be interpreted less in accordance 
with the context and meaning of the applicant, that is, an exegetical 
interpretation which reads out of the documentary and oral evidence 
what the refugee intends to convey. One would understandably suspect 
a continuation of this prior state because DNA is the quintessential 
exegetic object: it is treated as accurate, prophetic, and unambiguous. 
In other words, “DNA doesn’t lie” and “DNA is science—it cannot be 
faked.” Yet DNA testing technology is governed by human agents. A 
detached, scientific, and objective reading of DNA to establish a 
legitimate family is itself a subjective decision that accepts certain 
understandings and forecloses others. The state can thus impose its 
interpretation on the applicant’s molecularly scriptured body, reading 
into and out of the body what it wants to find. Positivistic 
interpretations of our basic building blocks of life do no justice to the 
mythological and cultural significance they import, nor to the wider 
symbolic and deeply engrained values each culture ascribes to the 
body, psyche, and soul. 
Three consequences arise from required DNA testing. First, the 
interpretive and evidential turn towards the molecular level creates a 
gulf between what is seen—acts of humanitarianism, justifiable 
prevention of fraud, increased opportunity for reunification of certain 
families—and what may be intended—highly contestable and political 
actions of decreeing who is and is not part of the family. Second, the 
                                                                                                                                            
immigrants and refugees have access to medical services through humanitarian 
NGOs, judges expect ‘richer evidence.’”). 
114 See infra Part D. 
115 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE (Werner 
Hamacher & David E. Wellbery eds., Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., Stanford 
University Press, 1998) (1995). 
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focus and over-reliance on the molecular can blind other 
assemblages—the non-somatic testimony comprised of documentary 
and oral evidence—that may be equally if not more important.116 
Third, intermediating laboratories, USCIS, and the Bureau can 
disculpate themselves from contestable agency by transforming DNA 
into a locus of responsibility, that is, an externalization-through-
internalization. The AABB accredited scientific lab and USCIS and 
the Bureau interpret the DNA sample according to their own 
categorical presuppositions, but the cause of the outcome, whether 
admittance or denial, is placed in the truth-telling DNA, not in any 
individual, laboratory, or government body. By reading into the body 
certain understandings, but holding DNA out as the objective standard 
bearer of ultimate truth, responsibility for latent political decisions or 
an adverse finding is shifted from the entity requesting DNA or 
performing DNA analysis to the individual embodying it. “DNA 
doesn’t lie” is not merely a refrain of putative scientific accuracy, but a 
removal of agential blame for traumatic consequences. 
D. Of Risk Society and Hemonomy 
Countries instituted DNA testing in family reunification cases in 
the early 1990s,117 coinciding with the rising availability and reliability 
of testing technology. But if the original reason for DNA testing in this 
early era was to prevent fraud or help adjudicate particular claims that 
could not otherwise be resolved with suspicious, unreliable, or 
unavailable documentary evidence, as evidenced by the analysis in the 
Cronin memorandum from 2000, recent international events and 
ideological and political developments have given new impetus for its 
widespread adoption.118 That new impetus rests on concerns of 
national security and risk. 
National security discourse regarding immigrants and refugees is 
historically situated in the U.S., dating back to the Chinese exclusion 
                                                            
116 See Aizenman, supra note 11. See also Taitz et al., supra note 78, at 29 
(discussing how authorities have been accused of rejecting documentation they 
would have previously accepted now that DNA technology has become 
available). 
117 See, e.g., Aliens Act, (Act No. 301/2004), §§ 65–66 (Fin.) (allowing DNA 
testing to establish family ties since 1991). 
118 Zabjek, supra note 2 (noting that “[I]n the early 1990s, Canadian visa officers 
were increasingly seeing suspicious applications, raising concerns about the 
entire sponsorship process”). 
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statutes in the late nineteenth century and continuing through the 
anarchist fears of the early twentieth century and the Red Scare of 
1919–1921 and 1947–1957.119 Past immigration laws and policies 
were explicitly racist and interwoven with eugenical discourses. 
Today, the laws and policies are framed as responses to protean, 
systemic threats to the nation.120 Emily Holland documents the historic 
securitization of migration: 
Since WWII, and well into the Cold War, politicians and members 
of the media have characterized refugees and other migrants as a 
threat to countries’ political and economic stability, cultural values, 
physical security, and diplomatic relations. In the 1980s, claims 
arose regarding ‘bogus refugees’: individuals who had achieved 
refugee status but did not meet the immigration requirements to 
qualify as refugees. In the 1990s, refugees became increasingly 
associated with system abuse and fraud.121 
“Fortress America” is evidently an old concept, but there is a 
perceptible mutation in the placement of risk and criminality. Each is 
branded no longer explicitly on race, but now tacitly on culture, such 
as “suspicious” Somalis. Fortress America’s risk discourse has been 
exacerbated by terrorist attacks in the new millennium. As political 
scientist Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia notes: 
[N]either the United States nor European countries dramatically 
changed their policy options in the aftermath of 9/11. Rather, they 
simply strengthened existing measures or implemented reforms. 
Interestingly, the ‘new’ threats were not perceived as an incentive 
for policy innovation, but rather as the a posteriori legitimation of 
previous, failed policies. Such a reflexive tendency to do ‘more of 
the same’ raises serious concerns about the relevance of both the 
premises and stated objectives of current immigration policies.122 
                                                            
119 Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime 
Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1832–34 (2007); Ruchir 
Patel, Immigration Legislation Pursuant to Threats to US National Security, 32 
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 83, 84–86 (2003). 
120 Holland, supra note 3, at 1670. 
121 Id. 
122 ARIANE CHEBEL D’APPOLLONIA, FRONTIERS OF FEAR: IMMIGRATION AND 
INSECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 7 (2012). See also Catarina 
Kinnvall & Paul Nesbitt-Larking, Securitising Citizenship: (B)ordering 
Practices and Strategies of Resistance, 27 GLOBAL SOC’Y 337, 347 (2013) 
("[T]he securitisation of borders is not simply about manipulating and 
mobilising opinion but also describes the process through which individuals and 
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Thus, in the aftermath of 9/11, there was an intensification of 
securitization measures against immigrants and refugees. Among the 
flurry of legislation passed in the aftermath of 9/11, the PATRIOT Act 
promoted further biometric testing to prove individuals’ identities123 
and abolished the Immigration and Naturalization Services, which was 
absorbed into departments handling national security and health: 
Homeland Security (and USCIS, created in March 2003) and the 
Department of Health and Human Services.124 In the aftermath of the 
bombings in Madrid on March 11, 2004 and London on July 7, 2005, 
governments around the world further strengthened securitization 
measures,125 prompting fears among refugees that their treatment 
within refugee camps would worsen, and that admission to safe haven 
countries would plummet.126 Such fears were substantiated, as refugee 
                                                                                                                                            
groups struggle to cope with uncertainty and insecurity/ies. This mode of 
powerlessness and anxiety clearly predates 9/11, but it has also created a 
foundation for emerging responses to this event and others like it, as such 
responses have thrived on the sensibility of vulnerability."). 
123 Holland, supra note 3, at 1670. 
124 Id. 
125 D’APPOLLONIA, supra note 122, at 103. 
126 See, e.g., Marc Lacey, Letter From Kenya: London Attacks Raise Anxiety in a 
Far Place, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 3, 2005, at 2, available at: http://
www.nytimes.com/2005/08/02/world/africa/02iht-journal.html?_r=0 (quoting a 
Somali refugee in Kenya on rising anxiety after the terrorist attacks that 
repercussions will be felt by those of east African origin: “Sometimes we don’t 
feel like human beings . . . [w]e aren’t dead, but we’re not living either. We’re 
suspended in the air.”). The Boston Marathon bombings on April 15, 2013 have 
also prompted questions about whether refugee and asylum programs should be 
revamped because of weaknesses in security screening. See Ashley Parker & 
Michael D. Shear, Senator Says Boston Attack Should Factor in Immigration 
Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2013, at A13, available at: http://www.nytimes
.com/2013/04/20/us/politics/senator-says-boston-bombing-should-be-factor-in-
immigration-debate.html (quoting a senior Republican on the Senate Judiciary 
Committee: “Given the events of this week, it’s important for us to understand 
the gaps and loopholes in our immigration system . . . . How can we beef up 
security checks on people who wish to enter the U.S.?”); Victor Davis Hanson, 
Confronting the Dreaded D-word, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2013, at B1, 
available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/apr/26/confronting-
the-dreaded-d-word/ (arguing that the government should be “disinclined to 
grant asylum to ‘refugees’ from war-torn Islamic regions and then allow them 
periodically to go back and forth from their supposedly hostile homelands”). 
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admissions to the U.S. after 9/11 have remained far below the pre-9/11 
admission levels.127 
There was also a shift in global discourse underlying the 
justifications for DNA testing to establish a family relationship. The 
Khatri memorandum from 2006 considered three benefits of instituting 
required DNA testing to verify an alleged biological relationship.128 
The first one listed was that it would be a benefit to national security 
“by deterring fraud and bringing scientific certainty to USCIS 
adjudications.”129 Similarly, a 2008 CRS Report for Congress on 
immigration fraud stated that, “Since the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001 the policy priorities have centered on document integrity and 
personal identification with a sharp focus on intercepting terrorist 
travel and other security risks.”130 
As noted by social scientists and legal scholars, security is a social 
construct that is malleable temporally and geographically within and 
outside a given community. It is not that security threats are purely 
incorporeal, but rather that a multiplicity of issues can be perceived 
and framed as threats to human lives and responded to politically.131 
The convergence of fraud and criminality or security discourses is 
becoming more pronounced,132 a symptom of what sociologist Ulrich 
                                                            
127 Holland, supra note 3, at 1671. 
128 Khatri memorandum, supra note 41, at 5. 
129 Id. at 5. 
130 WASEM, supra note 3, at 10. 
131 See, e.g., PETER HOUGH, UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL SECURITY 10 (2d ed. 2008) 
(discussing security as a human condition that should be defined in behavioral 
terms); Georgios Karyotis, Securitization of Migration in Greece:Process, 
Motives, and Implications, 6 INT’L POL. SOC. 390, 390 (2012) (discussing how 
securitization of migration in Greece was not an inevitable result of a public 
order or economic crisis, but rather primarily a crisis and threat of the “Other,” 
constructed by political and security elites as undesirable, dangerous, and 
inferior); Karsten Friis, From Liminars to Others: Securitization Through 
Myths, 7 PEACE AND CONFLICT STUD. 1, 3 (2000) (discussing the Copenhagen 
School of security studies that rejects security as something objectively “given”, 
but regarding it rather as a social process applicable to any perceived value and 
any chosen referent object). See also Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking, supra note 
122, at 359 ("Those who live within the cracks of the securitised order, who are 
designated other and outsider, or the enemy within, find themselves dislocated 
by the reconfigurations of borders that take place as regimes respond to 
uncertainty and threat."). 
132 See, e.g., Anna Pratt & Mariana Valverde, From Deserving Victims to ‘Masters 
of Confusion’: Redefining Refugees in the 1990s, 27 CANADIAN J. SOC. 135, 150 
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Beck has termed “risk society.”133 In these societies, “the 
consequences and successes of modernization become an issue with 
the speed and radicality of processes of modernization.”134 
Two recent European examples epitomize such legal and 
sociopolitical alterations. In October 2007, the French Parliament 
signed a new immigration bill, an “Act relating to the control of 
immigration, integration and asylum.”135 Article Thirteen of the bill 
would have allowed a consular agent expressing any “serious doubt 
about the authenticity” of the legitimacy of a claimed relation between 
an applicant and a family member living in France to compel the 
applicant to undergo a DNA test to prove a genetic relation to the 
applicant’s mother.136 The bill limited the test to applicants from 
twenty specific countries, the majority of which were African.137 In 
November 2007, the bill passed scrutiny in the country’s highest 
constitutional court.138 The court ruled that because the DNA test was 
voluntary, it did not violate French law—even though the country’s 
Civil Code states that studies of a person’s genetic information can 
only be used with consent for medical or scientific research, or by 
                                                                                                                                            
(2002) (discussing measures adopted by the Canadian government in the mid-
1990s to deal with undocumented Somali refugees that were driven in part by 
concerns of fraud); Miranda Devine, Fooled by a Ship of Frauds, SUNDAY TEL. 
(Austl.), May 6, 2012, at 49 (discussing how claims of widespread fraud in 
immigration visa applications have “implications for national security”). 
133 ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY (Mark Ritter trans., 
Sage Publications 1992) (1986) [hereinafter RISK SOCIETY]; ULRICH BECK, 
WORLD AT RISK (Ciaran Cronin trans., Polity, 2007) [hereinafter WORLD AT 
RISK]. 
134 WORLD AT RISK, supra note 133, at 6. 
135 See Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2007-
557DC, Nov. 15, 2007, J.O. 19001 (Fr.), available at http://www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/a2007557dc.pdf 
[hereinafter Constitutional Court decision]. 
136 Roya Hajbandeh, ‘France, Love it or Leave it’: New French Law Restricts 
Family Reunification, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 335, 343 (2009). See also Tera Rica 
Murdock, Whose Child is This?: Genetic Analysis and Family Reunification 
Immigration in France, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1503 (2008). 
137 Hajbandeh, supra note 136, at 343. 
138 See Constitutional Court decision, supra note 135 (The Constitutional Court 
ruled that one section of the bill, unrelated to genetic testing, was 
unconstitutional). 
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court order.139 While labeled as “disgusting” by a member of then 
President Nicolas Sarkozy’s own cabinet and as creating “an 
environment of racial legitimization” by the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia 
and Related Intolerance,140 the majority of the French public approved 
DNA testing.141 In late 2009, however, the government scrapped the 
DNA test provision because of logistical problems and concerns about 
France’s image abroad.142 
In 2009, the U.K. Border Agency143 launched its Human 
Provenance Pilot Project, which sought to determine the current 
national origin of refugees.144 From September 2009 until March 2010, 
save for a six-week suspension due to early criticisms, the project 
                                                            
139 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 16-10 (Fr.) (“An examination of the genetic particulars 
of a person may be undertaken only for medical purposes or in the interest of 
scientific research.”). See also CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 16-11 (Fr.) (“The 
identification of a person owing to his genetic prints may only be searched for 
within the framework of inquiries or investigations pending judicial proceedings 
or for medical purposes or in the interest of scientific research.”) (Legifrance 
trans.). 
140 See Meaghan Emery, Europe, Immigration and the Sarkozian Concept of 
Fraternité, 21 FRENCH CULTURAL STUD. 115, 124 (2010). 
141 An OpinionWay poll conducted on October 11, 2007 found that 56 percent 
supported DNA testing of immigrants. See Sally Marthaler, Nicolas Sarkozy and 
the Politics of French Immigration Policy, 15 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 382, 392 
(2008). Another newspaper poll found that 49 percent supported the test, while 
43 percent were opposed to it. See Hajbandeh, supra note 136, at 345. 
142 France Stops Controversial DNA Testing Law, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL 
(Paris), Sept. 15, 2009, available at http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/
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(quoting then-Interior Minister Eric Besson as saying that the provision “in the 
end . . . serves no purpose other than to bring the image of France into 
disrepute” and “the genetic samples should be taken by a doctor . . . [but] our 
consulates aren’t equipped for that [and] we’d need to invest a lot of resources 
for a very marginal interest”). 
143 On March 26, 2013, the British government announced that the U.K. Border 
Agency would be abolished and its work returned to the Home Office, the 
ministerial department responsible for immigration. See UK Border Agency ‘Not 
Good Enough’ and Being Scrapped, BBC NEWS, Mar. 26, 2013, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21941395. 
144 Human Provenance Pilot Project: Resource Page, GENOMICS NETWORK, http://
www.genomicsnetwork.ac.uk/cesagen/events/pastevents/
genomicsandidentitypoliticsworkstream/title,22319,en.html (last visited Apr. 30, 
2013). 
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tested 100 individuals’ mitochondrial DNA and Y chromosome, 
conducted analyses of single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), and 
tested isotopic ratios of elements such as hydrogen, oxygen, carbon, 
and nitrogen found in hair and fingernails.145 The Border Agency 
hypothesized that through this information, they could determine the 
nationality of refugees, and specifically, if they were from Somalia 
rather than from Kenya or another neighboring country.146 Scientists 
wrote in leading journals from the start of the project, condemning it 
as ethically and scientifically flawed.147 The U.K.’s government 
advisory panel, the Human Genetics Commission, recommended that 
the project be disbanded.148 Leading geneticists in the U.K. also 
questioned how the project was ever approved.149 In June 2011, the 
Border Agency tersely announced that it was ending the program and 
that no genetic information would be released.150 
While both of these examples may be culturally contextualized, 
they speak to several common threads that transcend geographic 
borders. First, they highlight how fraud is situated within a national 
security discourse that equates it with risk. The rhetoric of fraud, 
security threat, and risk provides a popular motive for governments to 
root out potential terrorists who could slip through the immigration 
                                                            
145 Editorial, Genetics without Borders, 461 NATURE 697 (2009). 
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147 See generally id.; John Travis, Scientists Decry Isotope, DNA Testing of 
‘Nationality’, 326 SCIENCE 30 (2009); David J. Balding et al., Genetic and 
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Genetics without Borders, supra note 145, at 697 (“The border agency says that 
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150 Hill & Henderson, supra note 149; Holland, supra note 3, at 1678. 
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and refugee system.151 In this “risk society,” the management of risk 
has significant bearings on the law’s power to act as if in a perpetual 
“state of exception”152 and to intervene through persons.153 Similarly, 
the examples show how states are increasingly (re)asserting their 
sovereignty over border control, often to the detriment of the human 
rights and desires of individuals who wish to reunite with their family. 
The introduction of genetics into the field of immigration and refugee 
law exacerbates the already fraught tension between politics and 
human rights. 
The examples also illustrate how states place ever greater faith in 
the objectivity of science. DNA testing is understandably treated by 
policymakers and immigration officials as scientific and accurate. But 
“scientific” and “accurate” often dangerously elide with “objective” in 
determining truth—even if the science has not yet caught up to the 
purported aims of the immigration and refugee policy, such as 
pinpointing national origins. Relatedly, DNA testing is viewed as a 
morally neutral technology. While many scholars have contested the 
supposed moral neutrality of technology,154 others go further and 
question the motives of the actors who produce and use technology,155 
including in politically charged fields like immigration. In particular, 
one can unpack the latent dilemmas that are created by using genetic 
markers to determine what constitutes a family, or what immigration 
law expert Professor Janice Villiers calls the potential replacement of 
“social relationships with genetic relationships.”156 DNA testing in the 
immigration and refugee context may be an example of what the 
                                                            
151 Holland, supra note 3, at 1670–72. 
152 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., University of 
Chicago Press, 2005) (2003); CONTEMPORARY STATES OF EMERGENCY: THE 
POLITICS OF MILITARY AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS (Didier Fassin & 
Mariella Pandolfi eds., 2010). 
153 RISK SOCIETY, supra note 133; RICHARD V. ERICSON & KEVIN D. HAGGERTY, 
POLICING THE RISK SOCIETY (1997). 
154 See, e.g., JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (John Wilkinson 
trans.) (1964); Henk A.M.J. ten Have, Genetics and Culture: The Geneticization 
Thesis, 4 MED., HEALTH CARE & PHIL. 295 (2001). 
155 See, e.g., Bruno Latour, Morality and Technology: The End of the Means, 19 
THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 247 (Couze Venn trans.) (2002); Peter Kroes, 
Technical Artefacts: Creations of Mind and Matter: A Philosophy of 
Engineering Design, in 6 PHIL. OF ENGINEERING & TECH. 163 (2012). 
156 Villiers, supra note 6, at 259. 
2013 Back to Blood 501 
bioethicist, lawyer, and historian Professor Paul Lombardo elsewhere 
has called “neo-eugenic schemes” treated as a “panacea for social 
conditions.”157 
To bring these examples and discussion into the Priority Three 
context, the U.S. government may be entering a world in which it 
makes decisions concerning future refugee admissions under 
conditions of a manufactured, self-inflicted climate of fear. In this 
environment, compulsory DNA testing is less a humanitarian act to 
resolve otherwise unclear family relationships and more a response to 
the anticipation of fraud by refugees, staged as a serious national 
security risk. This is a fundamental shift from the current government 
policy of DNA testing of immigrants (rather than refugees), which 
instructs field officers to “not request DNA in an attempt to disprove a 
relationship,” like requesting “DNA testing between marital partners 
on suspicion that they are blood relatives.”158 Now, every Priority 
Three refugee, viewed as the Other, is a suspect. But even among 
refugees, certain cultures are singled out, constituting what 
anthropologist Nadine Naber has termed “a dual process of cultural 
racism and racialization of national origin.”159 This is evident in an 
undated USCIS Senior Policy Council “Options Paper”: 
Revelation of [the 2008 DNA pilot test] high fraud rate in Africa 
raises serious national security concerns. Up until last year, when 
USCIS began bringing large numbers of Iraqi refugees to the 
United States, Somalia represented the largest source country for 
refugee admissions. Screening from this region is important, as 
evidenced by the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and 
Tanzania and the fact that Somalia has long been a haven for Al-
Qaeda. Adding urgency to the issue is the recent revelation that a 
naturalized U.S. citizen blew himself up in a suicide bombing in 
Somalia. The FBI is investigating, and is concerned that young 
men of Somali origin have departed the United States to fight and 
train overseas, possibly to return on U.S. passports to carry out 
terrorist acts here. 
                                                            
157 Kristen Philipkoski, Blaming the ‘Defective’ People, WIRED, Mar. 26, 2001, 
available at http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2001/03/42567. 
158 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 9, at N4(a). 
159 Nadine Naber, The Rules of Forced Engagement: Race, Gender, and the Culture 
of Fear among Arab Immigrants in San Francisco Post-9/11, 18 CULTURAL 
DYNAMICS 235, 236 (2006). 
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Leaving open loopholes that allow potential terrorists, or simply 
fraudulent applicants, to insert themselves in legitimate family 
groups . . . threatens our security . . . . 
. . . 
USCIS must protect the integrity of our immigration system, 
establish identity early on, and take steps to avoid granting benefits 
to criminals and terrorists.160 
The Options Paper does not discuss how conducting DNA tests 
will prevent terrorism, nor does it provide any evidence to substantiate 
a link between DNA tests and counter-terrorism. One may question the 
unsubstantiated and tendentious association of the embassy bombings 
and al-Qaeda with Somali refugees and the belief that DNA testing is a 
strong prophylactic for terrorism. 
The rhetoric in the Options Paper passage ably illustrates how in 
our “risk society,” actual harm is decoupled from risk, for “risk means 
the anticipation of catastrophe.”161 In an age where security is a value 
placed more highly than freedom and equality, references to open 
loopholes, urgency, FBI concerns, possible acts of terrorism on U.S. 
soil, and associations of terrorist attacks with refugees are as a whole 
compelling enough to justify intrusions on the Other. Threatening 
“new concepts of war,” where “combatants could be civilians” and 
“war zones could be our neighborhoods” means “manipulation of the 
aspiration for family life [cannot be] excluded.”162 Pernicious 
persecution must be the new normal in our continuous state of 
exception: “Once we understand that . . . family migration may be 
exploited for the purpose of terrorism, we understand that immigration 
laws and policies have to be used as a defensive measure.”163 This 
                                                            
160 U.S. CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES SENIOR POLICY COUNCIL, 
EXPANDING DNA TESTING IN THE IMMIGRATION PROCESS, available at https://
www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/USCIS_DNA_Senior_Policy_Council_
Options_Paper.pdf, at 1–3. 
161 WORLD AT RISK, supra note 133, at 9. 
162 Liav Orgad, Love and War: Family Migration in Time of National Emergency, 
23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 85, 126 (2008) (arguing that family migration in time of 
national emergency should be regulated by establishing a “Presumption of 
Dangerousness” in the Immigration and Nationality Act, which means that every 
non-resident enemy alien — or non-resident alien under the rule of states 
sponsoring terrorism — may present a security risk and is presumed 
inadmissible, but that the presumption may be refuted in special cases). 
163 Id. (emphasis added). 
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validates Beck’s contention that “to the extent that global risks cannot 
be calculated in accordance with scientific methods and prove to be 
objects of non-knowing, the cultural perception of global risk—that is, 
the post-religious, quasi-religious belief in its reality—acquires central 
importance.”164 To everyone’s loss, moral and political harm increase, 
for in the hemonomic order of required DNA testing of the non-
criminal refugee (but treated as the pre-judged criminal—or terrorist-
to-be), Priority Three inaugurates a neo-eugenical scheme of genetic 
selection not for the creation of future perfect children, but for future 
perfect securitized and Americanized refugees. 
IV. LEGAL CHALLENGES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
In this Part IV, I focus my legal critique on certain areas that are 
particularly impacted by compulsory DNA testing: consent, privacy, 
dignity, and discrimination. These areas will be analyzed from 
multiple legal frameworks. Canadian case law, which is rich in refugee 
DNA testing jurisprudence, is cited to provide comparative 
perspective, while international human rights law is discussed 
extensively as it offers a particularly productive frame of analysis. 
Refugees are entitled to full enjoyment of their human rights, as 
recognized in the 1951 Refugee Convention,165 but these rights 
consistently rub against competing rights of the federal government, 
including the sovereign right to control national borders. 
A. Impacts on Consent, Privacy, and Human Dignity 
DNA testing for forensic purposes, unlike whole genome 
sequencing or comprehensive genetic testing or screening, only 
                                                            
164 WORLD AT RISK, supra note 133, at 73. 
165 See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, pmbl., July 28, 1951, 19 
U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1951 Refugee Convention] (stating 
that “The High Contracting Parties, considering that the Charter of the United 
Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights approved on 10 
December 1948 by the General Assembly have affirmed the principle that 
human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without 
discrimination”). The U.S. is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention 
but the Senate ratified (with two reservations) the 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [herein 
1967 Refugee Protocol]. See 19 U.S.T. at 6257-58. The Protocol entered into 
force as to the United States on Nov. 1, 1968. Id. at 6257. The 1967 Refugee 
Protocol incorporates almost all of the 1951 Refugee Convention, but eliminated 
the temporal and geographic limitations of the latter. 
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determines identity or familial matching. Testing generally consists of 
genotypes at a panel of thirteen to twenty-five markers, all of which 
are short-tandem repeats (STRs).166 STRs are limited in scope and do 
not appear to have any known direct positive or negative predictive 
value for inferring phenotypes like a person’s appearance or health.167 
That said, mandatory DNA testing could still violate privacy interests, 
both in human rights instruments168 and in domestic legislation and 
common law for anchor refugees.169 
Refugees are afforded limited privacy protection with respect to 
the initial, required collection of DNA. Once anchors and claimed 
                                                            
166 See RAPID DNA SYSTEM PIA, supra note 58, at 3 (“The initial Rapid DNA 
prototype uses 13 STR loci to verify parent-child relationships.” . . .  “To allow 
for verification of grandparent/grandchild and sibling relationships, future 
prototypes will examine 26 loci. Since grandchildren only receive 1/4 of their 
DNA from a grandparent, twice as many loci are needed to verify that 
relationship at the same 99.5% likelihood threshold.”). 
167 See generally Sara H. Katsanis & Jennifer Wagner, Characterization of the 
Standard and Recommended CODIS Markers, 58 J. FORENSIC SCI. 169 (2013) 
(discussing whether genotypes in the criminal law-based Combined DNA Index 
System are causative or predictive of known phenotypes). 
168 See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 68, art. 12; ICCPR 1966, supra note 68, art. 17. For 
consideration of privacy interests in genetic information and DNA samples in 
the non-criminal and international human rights context, see Elizabeth B. 
Ludwin King, A Conflict of Interests: Privacy, Truth, and Compulsory DNA 
Testing for Argentina’s Children of the Disappeared, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 
535 (2011) (discussing right to privacy implications of Argentinean law adopted 
in 2009 that requires DNA testing of children suspected of being taken from the 
30,000 or so “disappeared” during the military junta of 1977–1983, in cases 
where the raising parents are suspected of having knowingly adopted their 
children illegally). 
169 Domestic law includes the Fourth and Fourteen Amendments of the U.S. 
Constitution, the Privacy Act of 1974, and state constitutions, laws, and 
regulations. For consideration of privacy interests in genetic information and 
DNA samples in the domestic and criminal context, see Maryland v. King, 569 
U.S. ___ (2013), No. 12-207 slip op, at *28 (2013) (Maryland’s DNA Collection 
Act, which allows DNA collection from persons arrested, but not yet convicted, 
for crimes of violence and burglary, ruled constitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment totality of the circumstances balancing test). See also 
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, PRIVACY 
AND PROGRESS IN WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING 68–69 (2012) [hereinafter 
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION] (noting that there is no standard or comprehensive 
approach to the protection of genetic information in the U.S., and the level of 
protection afforded to an individual’s genetic information differs from state to 
state). 
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family members provide a DNA sample, they have no right to consent 
to limits on its use,170 a situation distinct from federal and state health 
information and genetic privacy statutes that afford U.S. nationals 
(hence including anchor refugees) privacy rights and generally 
mandate informed consent.171 It is doubtful that refugees and family 
members are truly informed about the nature, risks, and benefits of 
DNA testing or have the ability to refuse testing without providing a 
legally acceptable justification.172 
The State Department has provided information about the retention 
and future use of the DNA sample and results. A Privacy Impact 
Assessment conducted in November 2011 revealed that personally 
identifiable information associated with the DNA test and maintained 
in the Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System database 
includes the date and number of the test, the name of the laboratory, 
and the test result sheet with genetic marker (allele) information 
redacted.173 The samples themselves will not be sent to or kept by the 
U.S. government,174 and no genetic information about applicants is 
                                                            
170 WRAPS PIA, supra note 61, at 10. 
171 Heath Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 45 C.F.R. § 160.203 
(2002); Genetic Privacy Act, MINN. STAT. § 13.386 (2012).  
[G]enetic information about an individual . . . may be collected by 
a government entity . . . or any other person only with the written 
informed consent of the individual [and] may be used only for 
purposes to which the individual has given written informed 
consent [and] may be stored only for a period of time to which the 
individual has given written informed consent.  
Id. It is unclear what “persons” other than governmental agencies are covered by 
the terms of the Minnesota Genetic Privacy Act. See Gordon J. Apple, Genetic 
Privacy in Minnesota: Unintended Conflicts and Consequences, 69 APR BENCH 
& B. MINN. 25 (2012). 
172 It should be noted that, in principle, some provision of information is provided. 
Prior to DNA testing, the Resettlement Support Center sends a letter to the 
anchor advising him or her that DNA testing is required, along with a “fact sheet 
about DNA testing” and a list of laboratories approved by the AABB in the U.S. 
where the testing must be done. Qualifying Family Members being tested 
overseas are also provided basic information about the “purpose” of DNA 
testing; it is unclear if they are provided a fact sheet. See WRAPS PIA, supra 
note 61, at 3. 
173 WRAPS PIA, supra note 61, at 1–2. 
174 Id. at 3. The WRAPS PIA indicates that DNA samples taken overseas are in the 
possession of a designated Resettlement Support Center staff member, in 
accordance with the chain-of-custody requirements of the AABB-approved 
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compiled or maintained in the Worldwide Refugee Admissions 
database.175 There is no evidence that the government is planning to 
create a DNA database for refugees, though given the rapid increase in 
DNA databases around the world and the overt link in government 
documents between Priority Three refugees and national security and 
terrorism,176 this policy may well change in the near future.177 
Control of dissemination of personal information is curtailed, and 
the disclosure of unexpected or adverse findings about the genetic 
identity of families violates dignity, which lies at the core of all 
humans. Numerous anecdotes attest to the fact that test results can be 
psychologically and socially disruptive and devastating for families, 
especially for children.178 No psychological or genetic counseling is 
                                                                                                                                            
laboratory, until they are mailed to the U.S. by the Resettlement Support Center 
for testing. Id. No mention is made if the samples are retained by the 
laboratories or immediately destroyed after testing, leaving open the question 
about their future use. 
175 Id. 
176 See e.g., U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, SENIOR POLICY 
COUNCIL, OPTIONS PAPER, EXPANDING DNA TESTING IN THE IMMIGRATION 
PROCESS 1–2, available at https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/
USCIS_DNA_Senior_Policy_Council_Options_Paper.pdf (“Leaving open 
loopholes that allow potential terrorists, or simply fraudulent applicants, to insert 
themselves in legitimate family groups . . . threatens our security.”). 
177 Holland, supra note 3, at 1675–76. 
178 See Esbenshade, Discrimination, supra note 48, at 187–88 (recounting situation 
of a mother in the 2008 DNA pilot project who had to tell her sixteen-year-old 
son that he was the product of a rape, even though the mother’s husband had just 
recently died and she had never wanted the son to know that her husband was 
not his biological father. The son cried upon learning the news; no counseling 
was provided). See also Nigerian Family Waiting for Reunion, TORONTO STAR 
(Can.), Dec. 29, 2011, at GT4 (discussing story of five young Sierra Leonean 
children, who two months after reuniting with their father in Canada, could not 
petition for their mother because a DNA test revealed that she was not the 
biological mother of two of the children and the High Commissioner of Canada 
in Ghana did not believe she was “in an ongoing genuine marital relationship” 
with the father); Zwaans, supra note 48 (discussing three brothers trying to get 
their remaining brother out of Guinea, but confronting problems because the 
brother “refused to have the DNA test because there is a high chance one of 
[his] children is not his,” and “if one of those kids is not his, he won’t be able to 
come, and what will that do to the family? He doesn’t want to put his kids 
through that.”); Zabjek, supra note 2 (discussing story of a young Kenyan boy 
whose mother was dead and learned he was not, in fact, the biological child of 
the man he knew to be his father and was thus rejected by the Canadian 
government). 
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provided by government officials before or after the DNA test. Human 
rights instruments recognize both the sensitive nature of genetic 
information179 and that each person is entitled to “social and cultural 
rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his 
personality.”180 Compared with Europe, Canada, and elsewhere, the 
U.S. has been reluctant to adopt the language of dignity in domestic 
legislation, though a federal bioethics commission has associated 
dignity with privacy as part of the principle of respect for persons.181 
Yet it is unclear what legal remedy may be obtained for the 
disclosure of unwanted information or information that can violate a 
refugee’s individual or family dignity. Human rights treaties have been 
deemed non-self-executing.182 Successful claims made under the Alien 
Tort Statute, which gives district courts original jurisdiction over any 
civil action by an alien for a tort committed in violation of an 
international or U.S. treaty,183 are unlikely since successful claims are 
                                                            
179 See U.N. Educ., Sci., and Cultural Org., International Declaration on Human 
Genetic Data, pmbl., 32d sess., 20th plen. mtg. (Oct. 16, 2003), available at 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/bioethics/
human-genetic-data/ [hereinafter IDHGD]. 
[H]uman genetic data have a special status on account of their 
sensitive nature since . . . they may have a significant impact on the 
family, including offspring, extending over generations, and in 
some instances on the whole group . . . and they may have cultural 
significance for persons or groups. 
Id. 
180 UDHR, supra note 68, art. 22. Article 22 is linked to the right to social security, 
but the drafting is awkward. For a history on the drafting of Article 22, see 
JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
ORIGINS, DRAFTING, AND INTENT 4–12, 199–210 (1999). 
181 See, e.g., PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 169, at 45 (“Respect for 
persons also encompasses respect for the individual’s dignity and privacy. 
Therefore, violation of an individual’s privacy, such as the misuse or 
unauthorized disclosure of whole genome sequencing data, demonstrates a 
violation of the principle of respect for persons.”). 
182 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 (2008) (“[W]hile treaties may comprise 
international commitments . . . they are not domestic law unless Congress has 
either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that 
it be ‘self-executing’ and is ratified on these terms.”). 
183 Alien’s Action for Tort, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2011); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 
U.S. 692, 720 (2004) (Alien Tort Statute does not create a cause of action, but 
instead merely “furnish[es] jurisdiction for a relatively modest set of actions 
alleging violations of the law of nations.”). 
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limited to specifically defined, universally accepted, and obligatory 
norms of international law. These claims have been limited to 
egregious abuses such as slavery, war crimes, or torture. Litigants 
must overcome U.S. government enjoyment of sovereign immunity.184 
Tort claims like invasion of privacy, failure to warn, or negligent 
infliction of emotional distress are also unlikely to succeed against the 
federal government or its agents due to the restrictive Federal Tort 
Claims Act185 and the potential for claims to be buried by public 
international legal wrangling. This situation itself perpetuates 
violations of dignity, given its close relation to due process and status 
to sue.186 
B. Intersections of Discrimination and Plenary Power 
Human rights instruments protect all individuals from 
discrimination on multiple grounds and entitle them to equal 
protection of the law.187 However, the exercise of sovereign power 
                                                            
184 See generally Anshu Budhrani, Regardless of My Status, I am a Human Being: 
Immigrant Detainees and Recourse to the Alien Tort Statute, 14 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 781 (2012) (finding that successful claims under the Alien Tort 
Statute are very limited unless there is strong evidence of cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment). See also Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 
1980) (Paraguayan former police chief successfully sued in U.S. by two 
Paraguayan citizens resident in the U.S. for torture and murder of family 
member committed in Paraguay); Sosa, 542 U.S. at 738 (kidnapping and single 
illegal detention of less than a day of a person wanted for murder, followed by 
the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment “violates 
no norm of customary international law so well defined as to support the 
creation of a federal remedy”); Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 
233 (2d Cir. 2003) (rights to life and to health are too indeterminate to constitute 
a cause of action under the statute). 
185 Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) (2011). See generally Paul F. 
Figley, Understanding the Federal Tort Claims Act: A Different Metaphor, 44 
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1105 (2009). The Federal Tort Claim Act 
expressly bars claims based on any injury suffered in a foreign country, 
regardless of where the tortious act or omission occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) 
(2011). See also Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9, 11 (9th Cir. 1964) 
(barring claim arising at U.S. embassy in Bangkok, Thailand). 
186 Jeremy Waldron, How Law Protects Dignity, 71 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 200, 208–10 
(2012). 
187 See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 68, art. 2; ICCPR 1966, supra note 68, art. 26. See 
also IDHGD, supra note 179, art. 7. 
 Every effort should be made to ensure that human genetic data and 
human proteomic data are not used for purposes that discriminate 
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over the control of immigration and refugee policy for ensuring 
security in the revamped Priority Three leads to questions about 
agency action. USCIS officials appear more willing to reject 
documents of refugees from certain countries or regions.188 It is 
understandable from a psychological standpoint that USCIS officials 
will overweigh or blindly accept DNA evidence and reject what was 
previously acceptable documentation when DNA technology, with its 
symbolic power of infallible truth and science, can provide clean 
answers without the need for perceived time-consuming, labor-
intensive, and fallible, subjective human decision making.189 
But this overreliance can be discriminatory; two types of 
discrimination in particular are worth mentioning.190 First, there is 
discrimination based on race, nationality, and culture. When 
governments involve themselves in the determination of identity and 
origin, possibly adverse differential treatment and impact arise. 
Indeed, instances from Europe191 and Kuwait192 show that the practice, 
                                                                                                                                            
in a way that is intended to infringe, or has the effect of infringing 
human rights, fundamental freedoms or human dignity of an 
individual or for purposes that lead to the stigmatization of an 
individual, a family, a group or communities. 
Id. “Discrimination” is used in this section to refer to distinctions among 
individuals or groups that are or should be socially unacceptable. 
188 See, e.g., Aizenman, supra note 11. 
189 Psychology studies in the criminal law context demonstrate that over-reliance on 
forensic technology like DNA testing (known as the “CSI-effect”) can increase 
the burden of proof on a defendant and lead to unwarranted convictions. See 
Jane Goodman-Delahunty & David Tait, DNA and the Changing Face of 
Justice, 38 AUSTRALIAN J. OF FORENSIC SCI. 97 (2006) (defining “CSI-effect” 
and providing a research review of the over-reliance on DNA testing). See also 
Jenny Wise, The New Scientific Eyewitness: The Role of DNA Profiling in 
Shaping Criminal Justice 238, 270–71 (Feb. 27, 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, University of New South Wales), available at 
http://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:4093/SOURCE02 
(discussing how an over-reliance on DNA evidence can lead to “lazy policing” 
and miscarriages of justice, and that one of the lesser-acknowledged impacts of 
the use of forensic DNA profiling has been the receding importance placed on 
other types of evidence). 
190 Other important types of discrimination, including discrimination based on sex, 
are worth future discussion. 
191 See, e.g., Taitz et al., supra note 78, at 29 (noting that “the Finnish government 
has most frequently required DNA testing of refugees from Somalia, Iraq, 
Angola, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo”). See also La Spina, supra 
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even if “voluntary,” can risk systematic discrimination against certain 
peoples.193 Overlapping with privacy interests, some refugees may 
have religious beliefs that forbid them from taking a DNA test, but 
there is no option to refuse a test on religious grounds.194 Similarly, 
refugees from countries that do not recognize legal adoption will face 
cultural and religious discrimination. However, if a cultural or 
religious discrimination complaint was filed, a court would likely find 
that reliance on personal choice and the customs of one’s country of 
                                                                                                                                            
note 10, at 48 (noting that the Portuguese government relies on vaguely worded 
laws and its discretionary powers to require DNA testing of immigrants almost 
exclusively from India and Pakistan). 
192 See Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Kuwait: Criteria and 
Procedures for Granting Citizenship to Bidoon Through DNA Testing, (Feb. 12, 
1999), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6ad602c.html 
(discussing how the government of Kuwait is carrying out genetic tests on 
stateless Arabs, known as the bedoun (also transliterated as bidoon and bedoon, 
meaning “without” in Arabic), who claim Kuwaiti nationality through family 
lineage, and quoting a Kuwaiti government official as stating that “adopting 
DNA testing is a non-negotiable basis to assess the right of citizenship through a 
claim of kinship to a Kuwaiti mother, father or other relative”); Naturalization 
of 35,000 Bedoon Pending DNA Tests, KUWAIT TIMES, July 3, 2012, available 
at http://news.kuwaittimes.net/2012/07/03/naturalization-of-35000-bedoons-
pending-dna-tests/ (reporting that 35,000 files of bidoun claiming Kuwaiti 
citizenship were transferred from the Central Agency for Illegal Residents to the 
Criminal Evidence General Department for DNA testing). According to the 
Chairman of the Central Agency for Illegal Residents, bidoun on limited pay are 
exempt from the fees charged for the DNA tests. A. Saleh, KHRS, CSRSIR 
Discuss Bedoon Naturalization, KUWAIT TIMES, Aug. 27, 2011, available at 
http://www.mideast-times.com/home_news.php?newsid=3522. 
193 Holland, supra note 3, at 1672–73. 
194 No U.S. case law appears to have addressed this issue in the immigration and 
refugee context, but case law indicates support for involuntary DNA testing of 
criminal suspects regardless of religious beliefs. See U.S. v. Brown, 330 F.3d 
1073, 1077 (8th Cir. 2003) (suspect charged with sexual assault failed to 
establish that involuntary DNA testing violated religious rights under Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act or First Amendment of the Constitution). There are 
two cases on point in Canada. See Uyanze v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship 
and Immigration), [2000] No. V98-03773 (Can. Imm. Ref. App. Bd.) (tribunal 
approved applicant’s petition to reunite with his son despite his refusal to take a 
DNA test because it contravened his beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness); Melese v. 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] No. TA5-12361 (Can. 
Imm. Ref. App. Bd.) (tribunal ruled that applicant was the biological daughter of 
father based on other evidence even though daughter refused to take a DNA test 
to prove filiation because it contravened her belief as a Jehovah’s Witness). 
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origin to foreclose other possible avenues to gain entry to the U.S. are 
not reasons to interfere with executive and legislative branch plenary 
powers to control immigration and refugee policy.195 
Second, there is economic discrimination, as the cost of the DNA 
test will fall on some of the poorest people in the world. DNA test 
prices are decreasing but still cost several hundred dollars,196 
presenting a significant obstacle for large families. Even if there is the 
possibility of a future reimbursement for a positive test result, many 
refugees may not have the funds to pay for the test up front, in which 
case a court might find relief—but only if other evidence strongly 
indicates a biological relationship.197 
However, in addition to the unlikely legal remedies available 
through tort law or human rights legislation or treaties, it is well 
established under the plenary power doctrine198 that courts will almost 
always defer to legislative and executive branch powers to 
discriminate against immigrants and refugees—and hence allow its 
domestic laws and policies to trump constitutional and human rights-
driven concerns about privacy, consent, and otherwise disparate 
treatment. Since Chae Chan Ping v. United States,199 the Supreme 
Court has recognized federal power to exclude foreigners as an 
                                                            
195 See, e.g., M.A.O. v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 
No. T99-14852 (Can. Imm. Ref. App. Bd.) (In this case, petitioner refused to 
adopt his non-biological son because doing so violated certain Muslim customs 
prohibiting adoption. However, the tribunal found that it was not a constitutional 
violation if foreign law does not make provisions for a certain legal procedure 
recognized in Canada, and that problems with foreign law are an insufficient 
reason to set aside or to read a meaning into a section of Canadian legislation 
which is clear on its face and in its interpretation to date). 
196 Refugee Health Quarterly, supra note 58; RAPID DNA SYSTEM PIA, supra note 
58. 
197 See, e.g., Sheikhahmed v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 
[1999] No. T98-04375 (Can. Imm. Ref. App. Bd.) (tribunal ruled that petitioner 
was credible in stating he could not afford the $3,000 for DNA tests for him and 
his two children left behind in Somalia and that special relief should be granted 
so his family could reunite in Canada). See also Mohamad-Jabir v. Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2008] No. TA3-06158 (Can. Imm. 
Ref. App. Bd.) (tribunal ruled that evidence established on a balance of 
probabilities that family was biologically related and that petitioner’s claim of 
inability to pay thousands of dollars for DNA testing was credible). 
198 See infra note 213 for citations and further discussion regarding the “Plenary 
Power Doctrine.” 
199 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
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“incident of sovereignty” that forms “a part of those sovereign powers 
delegated by the Constitution,” and which can be exercised “at any 
time when, in the judgment of the government, the interests of the 
country require it.”200 So strong is the power that Justice Frankfurter 
remarked in 1952: 
But whether immigration laws have been crude and cruel, whether 
they may have reflected xenophobia in general or anti-Semitism or 
anti-Catholicism, the responsibility belongs to Congress. . . . [T]he 
underlying policies of what classes of aliens shall be allowed to 
enter and what classes of aliens may be allowed to stay, are for 
Congress exclusively to determine even though such determination 
may be deemed to offend American traditions and may . . . 
jeopardize peace.201 
Indeed, the Supreme Court reaffirmed in 1976 that, “In the exercise of 
its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress 
regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to 
citizens.”202 Even after the passage of the seemingly liberal 
Immigration and Nationalization Act of 1965,203 judicial hesitancy 
over “policy questions [that are] entrusted exclusively to the political 
branches of our government”204 has allowed the executive and 
legislative branches to discriminate based on race,205 sex,206 age,207 
sexual orientation,208 political speech or associational activities,209 and 
                                                            
200 Id.at 609. 
201 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
202 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80 (1976). 
203 Roger Daniels, The Immigration Act of 1965: Intended and Unintended 
Consequences, HISTORIANS ON AMERICA (Apr. 3, 2008), http://iipdigital
.usembassy.gov/st/english/publication/2008
/04/20080423214226eaifas0.9637982.html. 
204 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 798 (1977); See Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 72–
3 (2001); See also U.S. v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d 
per curiam by an equally divided court, 131 S. Ct. 2312, 2312 (2011). 
205 Dunn v. I.N.S., 499 F.2d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 1974). 
206 See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 65 (1961) (holding that a statute to exclude 
women from jury service was upheld as constitutional). 
207 Nazareno v. Attorney General of U. S., 512 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
208 See Boutilier v. I.N.S., 387 U.S. 118, 118 (1967); See also Adams v. Howerton, 
673 F.2d 1036, 1036 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Longstaff, 538 F.Supp. 589, 589 
(N.D. Tex. 1982). 
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marriage.210 Reiterated as recently as 2009, “the [Supreme] Court has, 
without exception, sustained the exclusive power of the political 
branches to decide which aliens may, and which aliens may not, enter 
the United States, and on what terms”211 because immigration and 
refugee matters are “wholly outside the concern and competence of the 
Judiciary.”212 
Despite strong rebuke from legal scholars,213 the plenary power 
doctrine will not dissipate in the post-9/11 climate that has caused a 
dominant re-assertion of state control of territorial borders. Thus, 
contrary to claims that globalization or transnationalism has eroded 
state sovereignty, Priority Three and related refugee policies that are 
embedded within a securitization and surveillance logic illustrate the 
ongoing capacity of the state to rule, to control, and to circumvent 
international norms and human rights. As Professor Chebel 
d’Appollonia remarks, “immigration [and refugee] policy remains one 
of the last bastions of the traditional Westphalian state.”214 The 
executive branch and Congress will continue to have the discretion to 
discriminate against non-nationals, and courts will unlikely involve 
themselves in cases of discrimination based on required DNA testing 
of certain categories of refugees. If they did, it is almost certain that 
they would find that required DNA testing of refugees and family 
members is rationally related to a legitimate government interest in 
preventing fraud, that is, illegitimate families. There is precedent for 
                                                                                                                                            
209 Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999). See also 
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972). 
210 See Almario v. Attorney General, 872 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1989). 
211 Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
212 Id. at 1026 (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 596 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
213 See, e.g., Jessica Portmess, Until the Plenary Power Do Us Part: Judicial 
Scrutiny of the Defense of Marriage Act in Immigration after Flores-Villar, 61 
AM. U. L. REV. 1825, 1865 (2012); Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of 
the Chinese Exclusion Cases: The “Plenary Power” Justification for On-going 
Abuses of Human Rights, 10 ASIAN L.J. 13, 35–36 (2003); Hiroshi Motomura, 
Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power. Phantom Constitutional 
Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 549 (1990). But see 
Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology and 
Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 
14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 287 (2000) (arguing that the plenary power doctrine 
is largely dicta, albeit harmful dicta). 
214 D’APPOLLONIA, supra note 122, at 17. 
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such speculation, including a 1982 Ninth Circuit opinion addressing 
immigrants and same-sex marriages: 
Congress manifested its concern for family integrity when it 
passed laws facilitating the immigration of the spouses of some 
valid heterosexual marriages. This distinction is one of many 
drawn by Congress pursuant to its determination to provide 
some—but not all—close relationships with relief from 
immigration restrictions that might otherwise hinder reunification 
in this country . . . . In effect, Congress has determined that 
preferential status is not warranted for the spouses of homosexual 
marriages. Perhaps . . . this is because homosexual marriages never 
produce offspring, because they are not recognized in most, if in 
any, of the states, or because they violate traditional and often 
prevailing societal mores. In any event, having found that 
Congress rationally intended to deny preferential status to the 
spouses of such marriages, we need not further ‘probe and test the 
justifications for the legislative decision.’215 
Legislative discretion creates a troublesome void in respect for 
persons, as the near absolute removal of judicial oversight increases 
the risk of multiple human rights violations. It therefore urges one to 
consider alternative paths to justice. Policies that adversely impact 
consent, privacy, and dignity, and that have a discriminatory purpose 
or effect should, in the interest of fundamental human rights and 
legitimacy, be proportional to the perceived need to prevent legitimate 
fraud or protect enduring American values. 
V. SOME ALTERNATIVE PATHS 
Though this Article has expressed serious reservations about the 
new Priority Three policy, it should not be read as a rebuke of all the 
underlying rationales. Biometrics and DNA technology have proven 
useful in a variety of contexts to improve distribution of resources and 
curtail fraud.216 DNA testing can provide a credible means of 
establishing some form of identity and allow families to reunite when 
other documentation is unavailable. In a climate awash in concerns of 
fraud and national security, DNA testing provides political viability 
                                                            
215 Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1042–43 (9th Cir., 1982) (quoting Fiallo v. 
Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799 (1977)). 
216 See Achraf Farraj, Refugees and the Biometric Future: The Impact of Biometrics 
on Refugees and Asylum Seekers, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 891, 914–19 
(2011) (describing the various UNHCR-endorsed uses of biometrics to deter 
fraud and detention and improve distribution of aid in refugee camps). 
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that may well sustain Priority Three, and in this sense, it is better to 
have a priority system for family reunification for refugees than none 
at all. Nonetheless, the problems and risks associated with required 
DNA testing of refugees have not been adequately addressed by the 
federal government, and Part IV posits that traditional legal solutions 
may not be viable. This Part V therefore proposes five policy-oriented 
solutions that mitigate the impact of the new policy, allowing for a 
nuanced understanding of family and a firmer understanding of the 
inherent but uncertain risks of DNA technology in the refugee (and 
immigration) context. 
A. Adopting the Proportionality Principle 
The plenary power of the executive branch and Congress to 
regulate immigration and refugee law is not absolute. As noted by 
constitutional and human rights lawyer Shayana Kadidal, the power is 
not enumerated in the Constitution but instead is “inherent in 
sovereignty.”217 That is, the power is a creation and function of 
international law. For Kadidal, the plenary power can therefore be 
limited by the same body of law that creates it. International law and 
the proportionality principle in particular can be used by courts to 
weigh the public interest asserted by the state against the hardship 
endured by an immigrant or refugee through some sanction or 
procedure in an individual case, even in a case where a court would 
otherwise defer to the plenary power of Congress.218 
Scholars contend that the proportionality principle has particular 
resonance in immigration law proceedings given the principle’s 
historical association with ensuring the proper balance of punitive 
                                                            
217 Shayana Kadidal, “Federalizing” Immigration Law: International Law as a 
Limitation on Congress’s Power to Legislate in the Field of Immigration, 77 
FORDHAM L. REV. 501, 504 (2008). See also Mark R. von Sternberg, The 
Plenary Power in a Human Rights Perspective, 16 PACE. INT’L L. REV. 65, 69–
70 (2004) (discussing how the 2001 Supreme Court decisions in Zadvydas v. 
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, and I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, were important judicial 
checks on the plenary power doctrine and that modern international human 
rights laws place restrictions on unfettered state sovereignty). 
218 Kadidal, supra note 217, at 514–15, 518–521. Kadidal argues that international 
law norms may diminish Congress’s plenary powers over time: “As the fount of 
Congress’s supposedly ‘plenary’ power over aliens, international law also 
provides fundamental limitations on that power—limitations which we can 
expect will become more robust with time, and which, one hopes, federal courts 
will continue to see fit to enforce.” Id. at 527. 
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measures.219 Law professor Michael Wishnie argues, for instance, that 
“the plenary power doctrine does not preclude a constitutional 
proportionality analysis” in cases of immigration sanctions, such as 
where an immigrant faces detention or a removal order for almost any 
violation.220 In his view, “case-by-case proportionality review is an as-
applied challenge, which does not implicate the plenary power 
doctrine quite so directly” because it often “implicates neither foreign 
affairs nor national security.”221 Professor Wishnie concedes that 
making a categorical (rather than a case-by-case) proportionality test 
claim would more explicitly challenge the plenary power doctrine, 
though it would invade federal sovereignty no less than court decisions 
invalidating state capital punishment or life-without-parole sentences 
for juveniles have done for state sovereignty.222 
The proportionality principle does not only apply to punitive 
measures, however.223 It dates back in the West to Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics,224 is reflected in human rights instruments,225 
                                                            
219 Christopher Michaelsen, Reforming Australia’s National Security Laws: The 
Case for a Proportionality-Based Approach, 29 U. TAS. L. REV. 31, 38 (2010) 
(noting that the proportionality principle is “readily applied in criminal justice 
policy and criminal law where the severity of punishment is expected to be 
proportionate to the seriousness of the crime.”). 
220 Michael J. Wishnie, Immigration Law and the Proportionality Requirement, 2 
U.C. IRV. L. REV. 415, 447 (2012) (arguing that removal orders by the U.S. 
government against immigrants should be subject to constitutional 
proportionality review, both on a case-by-case basis and categorically, under the 
command of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and in some cases the 
Eighth Amendment) [hereinafter Wishnie, Immigration Law]. See also Juliet 
Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683 (2009); Angela M. 
Banks, Proportional Deportation, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1651 (2009); Angela M. 
Banks, The Normative and Historical Cases for Proportional Deportation, 62 
EMORY L.J. 1243 (2013). 
221 Wishnie, Immigration Law, supra note 220, at 447. 
222 Id. at 448. 
223 Michaelsen, supra note 219, at 38 (“At the national level, many liberal 
democratic systems recognise the principle of proportionality as a key 
component of criminal, administrative and constitutional law.”). 
224 Eric Engle, The History of the General Principle of Proportionality: An 
Overview, 10 DARTMOUTH L.J. 1, 3 (2012). 
225 For example, the proportionality principle is reflected in the UNHCR Note on 
DNA Testing to Establish Family Relationships in the Refugee Context, which 
protects the right to privacy. The Human Rights Committee has stated that any 
interference with the right must be “a proportionate means to achieve a 
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and has been applied by courts around the world as a mechanism to 
guarantee the full respect of human rights by the state.226 The 
European Court of Human Rights has invoked the principle in 
immigration and refugee cases involving deportation;227 in turn, 
several U.S. federal courts have acknowledged the European Court of 
Human Rights’ rulings “as an authoritative source of international 
human rights law and as ‘indicative of the customs and usages of 
civilized nations.’”228 U.S. legal scholarship and jurisprudence is 
incrementally constructing a culturally-specific framework of 
proportionality,229 which can be seen as a more coherent, flexible, 
reasoned, scrutinized, and balance-favoring variation of its varying 
norms analyses, such as “scrutiny” for legislative and executive 
                                                                                                                                            
legitimate aim, which should be in the interest of society, be reasonable, and 
must comply with the provisions, aims and objectives of the ICCPR.” See UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Note on DNA Testing to Establish 
Family Relationships in the Refugee Context, June 2008, 3, available at http://
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48620c2d2.html [hereinafter UNHCR Note on 
DNA Testing]. See also Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 16: 
Article 17 (Right to Privacy), The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home 
and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation, Apr. 8, 1988, 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/453883f922.html. See 
generally Michaelsen, supra note 219, at 40–41. 
226 See Juan Cianciardo, The Principle of Proportionality: The Challenges of 
Human Rights, 3 J. CIV. STUD. 177, 177–78 (2010). 
227 Kadidal, supra note 217, states; 
Article 8 of the European Convention mandates application of a 
proportionality test to the expulsion of noncitizens with strong 
family ties to the deporting nation and/or very few links to the 
country to which they would be sent. The standard applied by the 
court assesses whether deportation is justified by a ‘pressing social 
need’ and whether the interference with family life is 
disproportionate with respect to the public interest to be protected. 
Id. at 519. 
228 Id. at 519 (quoting Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 797 (D. Kan. 
1980), aff’d sub nom. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th 
Cir. 1981)). 
229 See Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American 
Rights Review and the Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 874–75 
(2011). See also STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A 
JUDGE’S VIEW, 163–64 (2010); see generally E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARD 
S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW: CONTROLLING 
EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS (2009) (arguing that proportionality review 
is emerging in U.S. law but is not yet a unified theory). 
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impingement on civil rights, “reasonableness” for searches and 
seizures, and “fair notice” for imposition of criminal liability.230 The 
Supreme Court has also been increasingly citing the principle in its 
decisions,231 though the focus, at least from a constitutional 
perspective, remains on criminal and civil sanctions.232 
Broadly speaking, the principle holds that statutes or policies that 
significantly implicate competing constitutionally protected interests 
and human rights in complex ways should be proportionate. It can be 
                                                            
230 See Bernhard Schlink, Proportionality in Constitutional Law: Why Everywhere 
But Here?, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291, 297 (2012) (“Whenever American 
courts review limitations and intrusions with strict scrutiny or a middle tier of 
scrutiny, or even with a requirement of mere rationality, theirs is a means-end 
analysis that is a more-or-less thorough proportionality analysis.”). See also 
Engle, supra note 224, at 10 (“Means-end review with strict scrutiny for suspect 
classes and proportionality are methodologically synonymous.”). 
231 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689–90 (2008) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). 
[W]here a law significantly implicates competing constitutionally 
protected interests in complex ways, the Court generally asks 
whether the statute burdens a protected interest in a way or to an 
extent that is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon 
other important governmental interests . . . . Any answer would 
take account both of the statute’s effects upon the competing 
interests and the existence of any clearly superior less restrictive 
alternative . . . . Contrary to the majority’s unsupported suggestion 
that this sort of ‘proportionality’ approach is 
unprecedented, . . . the Court has applied it in various 
constitutional contexts, including election-law cases, speech cases, 
and due process cases. 
Id. See also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560–61 (2005). 
 The prohibition against ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ . . . must 
be interpreted according to its text, by considering history, 
tradition, and precedent, and with due regard for its purpose and 
function in the constitutional design. To implement this framework 
we have established the propriety and affirmed the necessity of 
referring to ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society’ to determine which punishments 
are so disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual. 
Id. See generally Michael J. Wishnie, Proportionality: The Struggle for Balance 
in U.S. Immigration Policy, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 431, 446–51 (2011) [hereafter 
Wishnie, Proportionality]. 
232 Wishnie, Proportionality, supra note 231, at 446–51. 
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seen as comprising three sub-principles:233 (1) adequacy: the policy 
must be suitable to achieve its stated purpose; (2) necessity: the means 
chosen must be those of similar efficacy that are least restrictive of the 
constitutionally protected interests; and (3) proportionality in the 
narrow sense (also known as proportionality stricto sensu)—the 
advantages and disadvantages brought about by the policy must be 
examined to determine whether the balance is proportional. This is 
sometimes framed, albeit questionably, as a cost-benefit analysis;234 
however, a policy can only be proportionate if it does not affect the 
essential content of the involved interests or rights.235 
To engage in a better understanding of the inherent but uncertain 
risks of DNA testing technology in Priority Three, but also in the 
broader immigration and refugee context, a proportionality test should 
be used to inquire whether required DNA testing, given its possible 
violations of human and constitutional rights and interests, is justified 
by the ends it purportedly serves. That is, the new Priority Three 
                                                            
233 Cianciardo, supra note 226, at 179–81; Michaelsen, supra note 219, at 41–42. 
See also Schlink, supra note 230, at 292 (“The proportionality principle thus 
reads as follows: If you pursue an end, you must use a means that is helpful, 
necessary, and appropriate.”); Engle, supra note 224, at 2 (defining the 
proportionality principle as the legal rule that “state action must be a rational 
means to a permissible end, which does not unduly invade fundamental human 
rights”). Cf. MATTIAS KLATT & MORITZ MEISTER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
STRUCTURE OF PROPORTIONALITY 8 (2012) (“The proportionality test consists of 
four rules, namely legitimate ends, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in 
its narrow sense.”). The U.S. Supreme Court has adopted different criteria for a 
proportionality test in the context of criminal and civil sanctions. See Wishnie, 
Proportionality, supra note 231, at 446–49 (discussing a “narrow 
proportionality review” for case-by-case analysis and a second test for 
categorical review of a sanction that focuses on the nature of the offense or the 
characteristics of the offender). 
234 Cianciardo, supra note 226, at 180–81. See also Engle, supra note 224, at 8.  
Late modernity sometimes links proportionality (means end 
testing) with balancing (cost benefit analysis) or with examining 
the relationship between the value of the right invaded and the 
extent of the invasion of that right. The latter view is the better one 
to avoid confusion between economic cost/benefit analyses 
balancing alienable economic rights against each other versus 
proportionality analysis of conflicting constitutional rights. 
Id. 
235 Cianciardo, supra note 226, at 183. 
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policy should be subject to judicial (as well as administrative and 
legislative) review for conformity to proportionality principles. 
It is admitted that the proportionality principle has been advocated 
so far only in cases of immigration proceedings, particularly 
deportation hearings. But deportation and denial of family 
reunification on the basis of a mandatory DNA test both revolve 
around the potential fracturing of a family unit and can be seen as a 
sanction. The difference lies in the temporal imposition of the 
measure: deportation is punitive because it is a response to an alleged 
wrong, whereas required DNA testing can be seen as a coercive 
measure responding to a perceived risk. I suggest that, based on the 
precedent of the principle’s invocation in the context of sanctions, it is 
plausible that a refugee or U.S. citizen with standing can sue the 
federal government to challenge the constitutionality of required DNA 
testing on substantive due process and equal protection grounds under 
the Fifth Amendment. 
A plaintiff could claim, for example, that required DNA testing 
violates his or her liberty and privacy interests and subjects that person 
to an unfair burden compared to other refugees or immigrant families 
seeking reunification. Should a court look towards emergent norms of 
international law that place restrictions on national power, it may find 
that the proportionality principle requires a compelling state interest to 
mandate a test for a class of refugees that determines a family unit on 
biology alone. As Kadidal emphasizes, given the difficulties of a 
categorical proportionality challenge, “the reasonableness and 
proportionality of measures interfering with family integrity and 
association have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis,” but should 
also take into account the best interests of the child.236 
A counterargument is that in order to uphold obligations in law and 
policy to preserve the integrity of the family reunification process, the 
government has a legitimate interest in combating fraud and verifying 
family relationships where serious doubts remain—after all other types 
of proof have been examined. To this end, targeted DNA testing may 
be proportionate and legally justified. Indeed, since fraud is equated 
with national security, a challenge to the policy might confront the 
difficulty noted by Professor Wishnie: the plenary power doctrine is 
often used as a shield in cases implicating foreign affairs or national 
                                                            
236 Kadidal, supra note 217, at 519, 528. 
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security.237 Moreover, since the proportionality reviews under the Fifth 
Amendment have historically been limited to punitive sanctions,238 a 
plaintiff could have to make a difficult argument that a family 
reunification denial due to a mandatory DNA test result is a punitive 
measure that constrains some fundamental liberty interest. 
Yet if a challenge is made on a case-by-case basis and thus does 
not attempt to facially challenge the policy, there may be greater 
receptiveness by a court. Likewise, if the proportionality principle is 
applied to the policy not through the lens of a punitive measure, but 
rather through a public policy lens, greater receptivity could result. At 
base, this means that the analysis would not ask whether the new 
required DNA testing policy under Priority Three is a punitive 
measure that violates a procedural or substantive due process interest. 
Instead, the analysis would be whether the policy is a proportionate 
means of achieving the intended object of protecting against fraud in 
the refugee family reunification program, and possibly related objects 
such as the protection of Americans against potential security risks by 
refugees who fraudulently enter the country. 
A court may view a DNA dragnet approach as a disproportionate 
and punitive means of accomplishing the task of determining fraud. 
Required DNA testing is likely viewed as more intrusive by refugees 
and family members than other groups, given past persecution by their 
own government or persons their government has been unable to 
control. The Priority Three policy may especially run into difficulty on 
the second and third prongs of the proportionality test listed above, 
that is, necessity and the advantages and disadvantages of the policy. 
As discussed, it is doubtful that the policy complies with U.S. 
international human rights obligations. Fraud prevention and family 
relationship verification, as well as secondary benefits of national 
security, administrative convenience, and economic efficiency, do not 
seem advantages that are proportionally balanced by the significant 
costs incurred by mandatory DNA testing of Priority Three refugees 
and family members. 
The proportionality principle has application to all branches of 
government. Legal scholar Christopher Michaelsen notes: 
Proportionality . . . is not only a judicial doctrine for courts to 
apply in reviewing the legality of government action. It is also a 
                                                            
237 Wishnie, Immigration Law, supra note 220, at 447. 
238 Wishnie, Proportionality, supra note 231, at 458–59. 
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legislative doctrine for the political institutions to observe in their 
decision-making functions. As such, it forms an essential 
component of public policy and good governance.239  
Thus, courts, as well as the executive branch and Congress, when 
drafting or passing policies or regulations, should ultimately address 
the implications of required DNA testing of Priority Three refugees 
and family members in order to determine the constitutionally 
protected interests and human rights affected. They should decide 
whether required DNA testing affects any of these interests and rights 
and whether the means chosen are the least restrictive. The 
proportionality principle is clearly not problem-free,240 but it does 
offer a more promising path for guarding constitutional and human 
rights and interests. 
B. DNA Testing as a Government-Funded Last Resort with 
Protective Measures 
Aside from adopting the proportionality principle, there are several 
components involved in designing a more proportional test for truthful 
family reunification. First, the U.S. should follow the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees recommendations and the practices 
of other countries. DNA testing should be used only as a last resort,241 
particularly in situations where there are serious doubts about a stated 
relationship, or strong indications of fraudulent motives, and all other 
                                                            
239 Michaelsen, supra note 219, at 37. The principle as applied to public policy has 
origins in German constitutional and administration jurisprudence and is now 
utilized across Europe and countries such as England, Canada, New Zealand, 
South Africa, and Israel, as well as in international treaty-based regimes. Id. at 
39. 
240 See Schlink, supra note 230, at 299 (identifying not insurmountable problems of 
insufficient or ambiguous information and the subjective nature of balancing of 
rights, interests, and values). 
241 See, e.g., Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Operating Manual OP 1–
Procedures (August 16, 2012), s. 5.10, available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/
resources/manuals/op/op01-eng.pdf (“A DNA test to prove relationship is a last 
resort [hereinafter CIC Operating Manual]. When documentary submissions are 
not satisfactory evidence of a bona fide relationship, officers may advise 
applicants that positive results of DNA tests by a laboratory listed in Appendix 
E are an acceptable substitute for documents.”). See also UNHCR Note on DNA 
Testing, supra note 225, at 4; Holland, supra note 3, at 1680. 
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means and types of proof have been examined.242 DNA testing of 
children should only be done if it is in the best interests of the child.243 
Case-by-case assessments that involve looking at the particular 
relationships applicants engage in, from a functional and sociological 
perspective, are more appropriate and will not open the floodgates to 
administrative inefficiency or mass fraud. It may make the process less 
streamlined, but this is not necessarily a drawback. Streamlining in this 
situation may be more problematic as it removes the social 
significance and meaning of kinship and treats DNA tests as a quick-
fix panacea for fraud. Political scientist Anne Staver notes that “as the 
family is at once a subjective and an objective reality, objective ‘fraud 
proof’ criteria, such as the DNA tests are intended to be, are 
insufficient.”244 
Fraud prevention is a legitimate concern, and alternative measures 
to detect it have been proposed by scholars.245 Sociologist Jill 
Esbenshade suggests, for example, that strengthening the refugee 
registration system with resources to systematically document 
relationships and collect and store biometric identifiers during entrance 
registration, then rechecking and updating these throughout the 
process, is a reasonable alternative to tighten fraud controls.246 
Provided that this is accomplished in a way that respects cultural 
sensitivities about biometric collection,247 such an alternative path to 
fraud prevention is more proportional to the desired aims and 
respectful of refugees’ and family members’ rights. 
Second, when DNA testing is undertaken, true informed consent 
must be obtained from all mature and competent persons, including 
adolescents. This means disclosing in understandable language to all 
family members being tested, at a minimum, the nature and purpose of 
                                                            
242 UNHCR Note on DNA Testing, supra note 241, at 4. 
243 Id. at 6. 
244 Anne Staver, Family Reunification: A Right for Forced Migrants? 30 (U. 
Oxford Refugee Studies Centre, Working Paper Series No. 51, 2008), available 
at http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/working-papers-folder_
contents/RSCworkingpaper51.pdf. 
245 Villiers, supra note 6, at 268–70 (suggesting mechanisms from the Immigration 
Marriage Fraud Amendments Act of 1986, and the New York district-based 
“Stokes interview” to discourage marriage fraud, be implemented). 
246 ESBENSHADE, ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 15. 
247 See Farraj, supra note 216, at 940 (outlining measures to overcome cultural 
sensitivities to collection biometric identifiers for registration). 
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the test, information about collection, safe storage, both current and 
future use, all reasonably foreseeable risks—especially psychosocial 
risks—and benefits, and the consequences of refusing consent. All 
family members should be provided opportunities throughout the 
process to ask questions, and receive prompt and adequate responses, 
about the DNA test and its implications for the petition and for the 
family unit. It may be unrealistic to allow refugees or family members 
to control the informed consent process such that they can determine 
limits on the use of the DNA sample or genetic information, but basic 
provision of information to allow them to make an informed decision 
is an essential ingredient to respect them as persons and to fulfill 
human rights obligations and domestic laws. 
Third, required DNA testing is eminently different from voluntary 
DNA testing when it comes to the ethics of expense. When a 
physically intrusive procedure is mandated by the state for certain 
groups and the potential for violations of fundamental rights is 
heightened, as in compulsory or conditional screening for public health 
measures,248 the state should bear the burden of expense up front as a 
matter of social justice. After all, many refugees in Priority Three are 
unlikely to be in a position to readily incur the costs of testing. The 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has recommended 
that “the cost of a DNA test should be borne by the State requiring the 
test.”249 Given that there will only be an estimated 1,150 Priority Three 
refugees for fiscal year 2013,250 this proposal does not impose an 
onerous economic burden on the U.S. government. Rather than 
exacerbate a potential class-based system of refugee entries by now 
requiring refugees to pay the initial cost of required DNA testing, the 
government should cover the entire costs at the front-end. It should 
remove the eligibility-for-reimbursement clause for positive match 
results since it unjustly stratifies and penalizes refugee families who 
unknowingly are not genetically related. Just as important, genetic 
counseling should be provided pre and post-testing and paid for by the 
government in order to mitigate the potentially disruptive or 
destructive psychological trauma that can result from an unexpected 
                                                            
248 LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 395–
418 (2nd ed. 2008). 
249 UNHCR Note on DNA Testing, supra note 241, at 8. 
250 FY 2013 Refugee Admissions Report, supra note 17, at 20. 
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finding, and families should have the option to explain negative test 
results confidentially.251 
Fourth, as a last resort measure, DNA test results or scanned 
genetic loci should not be added to any DNA database for alternative 
purposes, especially for medical, criminal, or terrorism-related 
purposes. The government has pledged that genetic marker 
information will be redacted in the WRAPS database.252 It must be 
held to its word. Likewise, AABB accredited laboratories should 
specify publicly and transparently, and government documents and 
policies should make clear, what will happen to the DNA sample after 
testing. Finally, refugees and family members must be provided 
protective measures beyond pledges of strict security controls and 
oversight. This especially means ensuring rights of action so that if 
DNA samples or test results are compromised, refugees have an ability 
to obtain a remedy for the wrong committed. 
C. DNA Testing as Holistic 
The U.S. has historically recognized that the legislative intent of 
the Immigration and Naturalization Act is preservation of the family 
unit.253 Thus, reliance on genetic tests alone to determine legitimate 
familial bonds is insufficient. A negative DNA test result should not 
lead to automatic rejection of a petition and an assumption of a 
fraudulent relationship. Rather, refugees and family members should 
be provided an opportunity to explain negative test results and should 
be asked to undergo other examinations to determine if the petition 
should be accepted. This is the policy in other countries,254 including 
Canada, where negative test results for immigrants do not lead to 
automatic rejection but instead further examinations—even if it means 
treating biological relationships as legal fictions to uphold principles 
of natural justice. 
                                                            
251 Other countries address counseling. For example, Australia suggests applicants 
seek (at their own expense) counseling before deciding to undertake DNA 
testing and may provide counseling after the DNA test results are known. 
Australian Government—Department of Immigration and Citizenship—Fact 
Sheet 23: DNA Testing, available at http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/
23dna.htm. 
252 WRAPS PIA, supra note 61, at 1–2. 
253 See Villiers, supra note 6, at 268. 
254 See Taitz et al., supra note 78, at 27 (noting that in Australia and the 
Netherlands, negative test results do not necessarily lead to rejection). 
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In Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness) v. Martinez-Brito, the Federal Court dismissed an 
application for judicial review of an Immigration Appeal Division 
decision that determined a Canadian permanent resident had 
established, on a balance of probabilities, that his thirteen-year-old son 
was biologically his and therefore a member of the family class 
permissible for sponsored permanent residence.255 This, despite the 
fact that a DNA test indicated the son was not biologically his. 
According to the Court, the immigration officer responsible for the file 
violated procedural fairness and thus breached principles of natural 
justice by requesting a DNA test with a statement that, “If I do not 
receive word . . . that you will be proceeding with the DNA testing, I 
will assume that you are no longer interested in pursuing the 
sponsorship and will close the file.”256 Canadian immigration policy 
documents specify that a DNA test to prove a relationship is a last 
resort.257 Moreover, a 2003 Federal Court decision noted that because 
DNA testing intrudes into an individual’s privacy, it is “a tool that 
must be carefully and selectively utilized,”258 and a 2008 Immigration 
Appeal Division decision noted that, “A request for DNA testing 
should be limited generally to those relatively rare cases where viable 
alternatives to such testing do not exist.”259 Since “the officer simply 
demanded that the respondent and his sons undergo DNA testing or 
the file would be closed,”260 he disregarded his own agency’s 
operation manual and the judicial warnings. 
The Court ruled the DNA evidence and any evidence directly 
attributable to it was excludable since to reintroduce involuntarily 
obtained evidence, even that which disproved a biological relationship, 
“could lead to abuse and serious injustice”261 and a “breach of natural 
justice.”262 With the DNA evidence excluded, the Court still found 
                                                            
255 Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Martinez-
Brito, 2012 F.C. 438 (2012) (Can.), para. 57. 
256 Id. at para. 4. 
257 Id. at para. 45. See also CIC Operating Manual, supra note 241. 
258 Id. at para. 46 (quoting MAO v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration)), 2003 F.C. 1406, para. 84 (2003)) (Can.))). 
259 Id. at para. 47. (quoting Mohamad-Jabir v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration)), 2008 IADD 44, para. 33) (Can.))). 
260 Id. at para. 46. 
261 Id. at para. 51 (quoting R. v. G.(B)), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 475 at para. 33) (Can.))). 
262 Id. at para. 53. 
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acceptable the Immigration Appeal Division’s decision that the 
testimonial and documentary evidence established on a balance of 
probabilities that the father was the biological father of his son.263 At a 
time when the discipline of biology is moving away from a 
reductionist and analytic approach and is seeking to apprehend 
systems holistically,264 there is virtue for the law and government 
officials to view the biological and sociological family as interrelated 
concepts and, except in rare occurrences, to treat DNA test results 
merely as one part among many of an application to reunite a family, 
even if a result is negative. 
D. A Broader Construction and Definition of Family 
The federal government should follow the recommendation of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees by implementing a 
broader, flexible construction and definition of family that comports to 
sociological and humanitarian understanding, and which especially 
impacts African cultures.265 This would “accommodate the 
peculiarities in any given refugee situation, and help to minimize 
further disruption and potential separation of individual members 
during the resettlement process.”266 The current alternative to 
establishing genetic connections between parent and child, namely 
legal adoption, is not a culturally or legally permissible option in 
several Priority Three eligible countries.267 If refugee officials 
accepted broader, culturally-attuned understandings of the terms 
                                                            
263 Id. The IAD acknowledged that while “fictively trying to determine biological 
filiation on the basis of testimonies and documents alone is very difficult,” it 
was able to decide that “all the testimonies heard and evidence submitted 
established that the respondent continued to treat Luilly as his son and that, 
while there was no documentary evidence to support the respondent’s testimony 
that he continues to provide financial support for Luilly, the IAD had no reason 
to doubt his testimony.” Id. at para. 9, 12. 
264 Andrew C. Ahn et al., The Limits of Reductionism in Medicine: Could Systems 
Biology Offer an Alternative? 3 PLOS MED. e208 (2006), available at 
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed
.0030208; Hans V. Westerhoff & Bernhard O. Palsson, The Evolution of 
Molecular Biology into Systems Biology, 22 NATURE BIOTECH. 1249 (2004). 
265 Holland, supra note 3, at 1680–81. 
266 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Protecting the Family: Challenges in 
Implementing Policy in the Resettlement Context, June 2001, 2, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4ae9aca12.html. 
267 See discussion supra Part 2B. 
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parent, child, or spouse, it would afford refugees and family members 
better integration and support in the U.S. and lessen the potential 
economic burden imposed on the federal, state, or local government to 
support the resettlement process.268 
It is therefore as much in the interest of refugees as it is in the self-
interest of the government to accept that biological or legal ties are but 
one component of the thoroughly sociopolitical, cultural, multiplex 
realities that bind and sustain refugee families. Yet even if this ideal is 
not politically achievable, government officials should at a minimum 
work with resettlement agencies to both thoroughly inform all anchors 
and Qualifying Family Members of the Priority Three policy-based 
definitions of family and also develop a system to accept informal 
(extra-legal) adoptions or foster relationships as permissible 
exceptions to the otherwise biological or legally-driven family 
definition.269 
E. Transparency, Participation, and Collaboration 
If the executive branch truly aims to promote transparency and 
legitimacy in government,270 it should make USCIS and the Bureau 
more transparent in their policies and data, especially with aggregated 
statistics on DNA test results, by ensuring they are freely and publicly 
accessible to all interested parties. Effective public monitoring of 
Priority Three processing will allow it to proceed with integrity and 
accountability. Rapidly disseminating data openly will facilitate 
participation and collaboration among various communities that could 
result in better design of refugee policies and mitigate the risks and 
problems associated with controversial measures, such as required 
DNA testing. In sum, putting open government into action will go a 
long way to establishing trust among both the American public and 
refugees and creating innovative solutions to complex challenges, of 
which refugee resettlement certainly qualifies. 
                                                            
268 See Sample, supra note 73, at 51–52 (noting that through supporting family 
unity, the “economic burden” governments fear will actually lessen); Holland, 
supra note 3, at 1681. 
269 ESBENSHADE, ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 16. 
270 See, e.g., Memorandum for the Heads of Exec. Dept’s & Agencies (Jan. 21, 
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Transparency
andOpenGovernment; see also Open Government Initiative, THE WHITE HOUSE, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/open (last visited May 2, 2013) (detailing various 
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F. Family Reunification as a Moral Duty and Human Right 
Lastly, immigration and refugee advocates should continue to 
campaign for family reunification as a moral duty and human right 
owed to any settled refugee. This means that the right should be seen 
as not merely an obligation to admit refugees, which is already widely 
accepted as a duty of a liberal democratic state, but also an obligation 
to admit family members of settled applicants who are already 
governed under the liberal democratic state that has granted them 
refuge.271 By presuming that settled applicants’ family members, 
defined broadly in accordance with the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees recommendations, are legitimate refugees, 
the burden of proving otherwise falls on the government rather than on 
refugees. After escaping a life of misery, no refugee should be forced 
to choose between life and liberty or family life by submitting a DNA 
sample. As Staver writes: 
If the duty is also one to uphold particularly strong bonds, one 
must acknowledge that these bonds may have other bases than 
blood or conventional marriage. Conceived in such a way, family 
reunification would be a right not only for the nuclear, biological 
family, but for families as they self-identify.272 
VI. CONCLUSION 
To faithfully answer the question posed at the beginning of this 
Article—who are you, truly and truthfully?—one must view it as a 
constellation of dialogical explorations that move towards what can 
best be described as relational truth. That is to say, this cardinal 
question requires an epistemological ordering that sees belief and fact 
co-existing and truth dependent on the connections between object and 
subject, science and society, and technology and humans. These 
orderings have found common ground in the past and present, in the 
local and global. The ancient, southern African epistemology of 
ubuntu, for instance, expresses the belief that identity of the self is 
formed interdependently through community,273 while Professor 
Robert Ferguson writes that, “Everything must be shared for relational 
truth to emerge, and the transparency in that sharing must be absolute. 
                                                            
271 See Staver, supra note 244, at 26–28. 
272 Id. at 27. 
273 See, e.g., MICHAEL BATTLE, UBUNTU: I IN YOU AND YOU IN ME (2009). 
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Truth and truthfulness must come together.”274 But to this he adds that, 
“The engaged citizen in a republic of laws should never trust to mere 
authority . . . . [One] should remember that the law is only as strong as 
the justifications that make it true, and that it is subject to pressure in 
areas of controversy.”275 And so it must be for the imposition of DNA 
testing on Priority Three refugees and family members. 
We owe it to ourselves as engaged citizens in a republic of laws to 
question the purposes behind and assumptions of compulsory DNA 
testing and whether the ends sought justify the means imposed. Should 
the law weaken the presumption of innocence by treating all refugees 
and family members seeking to reunite in the U.S. through Priority 
Three as possible frauds? This Article has endeavored to show that it 
should not, for the sake of humanity’s concern for those most abused 
by fellow humankind. In our quest for accuracy—telling the true from 
the false—we must not lose sight of its coproduction with agency, for 
it is as much the authority determining what functions as truth as it is 
the genetic loci being scanned. 
By peeling back the layers of the new DNA testing policy, this 
Article has deconstructed the known and unknown to show that every 
first order action, even the seemingly minute ones as swabbing an 
inner cheek to capture DNA, has second order consequences, perhaps 
ones as profound as disrupting a family and crushing a child’s future. 
In turning our sociopolitical and legal gaze towards the near future, it 
is hoped that criticism of compulsory DNA testing of a category of 
people who have witnessed the worst of humanity will spur at least 
some of the reform and rethought proposed herein. Because fraud 
itself may be open to shifting planes of meaning,276 healthy skepticism 
towards the very foundation of this new government policy is 
warranted, necessary, and just. For it is only by asking the fundamental 
questions, by questioning authority, and by leaving no stone unturned 
that we discover the relational truth of blood and soul that constitutes 
our mutuality of being. 
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